Ironically Imran Khan may be Pakistans prime minister with half of Pakistan in civil war or already seceded from Pakistan.
Imran Khan will be most distrusted by the Baloch population.
The key lesson of Baloch history is " NEVER TRUST A PUNJABI OR HIS JUNIOUR PASHTUN PROXIES"
This is what the Baloch learnt in 1948 , 1958 , 1960-68 , 1974-76 , 2005 to date.
Agha .H. Amin
December 23, 2011
Dear All;
Several questions especially regarding military's role in political engineering in recent context, establishment's support of Imran Khan, droves of politicians joining his party especially former foreign minister, military's posturing etc. were asked. I summarized the answers in following piece although subject matter is quite vast. I have very little information about political forces and my main area of interest is military and militancy therefore I have focused on these areas.
Warm Regards,
Hamid
Smoke and Mirrors
Hamid Hussain
"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex and more violent; but it takes a touch of genius and lots of courage to move something in the opposite direction." Albert Einstein
General Pervez Mussharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif government in 1998 and in the prevailing international situation it was difficult to continue under direct military rule. Domestic and international circumstances dictated some kind of democratic set up to avoid complete international isolation as well as internal dissent. General Mussharraf got advice from different sources including serving and retired senior officers and intelligence community. Some suggested that politics should be completely kept out for few years and administration run by a team of technocrats under direct supervision of generals. One advice was complete quarantine of two major political parties; Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) faction while supporting a new and younger political set up. Others advocated picking off 'low hanging fruit' from old parties and presenting it in a new basket. One advisor; a retired Lieutenant General argued that despite all their flaws country finally had two main political parties that were national. He warned that any attempt to fracture these parties will only strengthen regional and ethnic parties that will be a bad omen for the federation.
In 1999, analysis wing of Military Intelligence (MI) authored a report arguing for supporting a new set up. Report recommended that new entrants with clean slate should be groomed and argued that by virtue of this quality of never being in government will make them acceptable to a major section of the population. Imran Khan was considered to be a suitable candidate and it was in this background that General Pervez Mussharraf had meeting with Imran Khan. This was MI's assessment and does not imply that MI officers had meetings with Imran Khan or frank discussions on the subject. The downside of this recommendation was the fact that military had to directly build the infrastructure of the new set up to make it a national and credible alternative. The other option of weaning off 'electable' known entities from different political parties and putting them under the umbrella of a new faction of Muslim League was much easier. General Mussharraf opted for the later option and several representatives of the army including Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), MI and some serving and retried generals (Director General of Punjab Rangers was one of these officers) were assigned this task. Twin instruments of rewards and threat of prosecution under the new set up of National Accountability Bureau (NAB) were used to get in line several politicians. A large number of politicians from PML-N formed Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) and this new set up was 'elected' to work directly under General Mussharraf. Some dissidents from PPP and many independents also joined the new government (one candidate who won as an independent was summoned by DG Rangers Punjab to his official residence and pointing to the guards with tall headgears threatened the honorable member that sometimes these guards throw the offenders right across the border). This set up was in place for five years and there was no role for Imran Khan. He continued as a 'lone ranger' crusading against corruption and presenting his own case.
Change of guard at General Head Quarters (GHQ) in late 2007 with General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani taking command of the army, increasing unpopularity of now civilian Mussharraf and 2008 elections ultimately resulted in departure of Mussharraf. Military was in a tough spot and they could not stop the wily Asif Ali Zardari to occupy the President House in the aftermath of the tragic assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto. GHQ never accepted Zardari as President and tried to quarantine him resulting in rapid deterioration of relations and this set the stage for byzantine intrigues. President Zardari and General Kayani were both responsible for the dysfunctional relations at the highest level and Wiki leaks cables from U.S. ambassador in Islamabad give an insight into the thought process of Pakistan's highest decision makers.
GHQ's problems with both major political parties, general disgust about corruption of all major political players and increasing popularity of Imran Khan opened the possibility of 'Khan Option' again in 2011. Rapidly deteriorating security situation including assassination of senior military officers, attack on army headquarters and poorly conducted military operations resulted in deterioration of army's image among general population. Killing of Osama bin Ladin by U.S. forces right under army's nose and brazen attack of militants on Mehran Naval base resulted in open and quite severe criticism of army. Clash with United States over Afghan policy was just the icing on the cake. Army tried to deflect some of these criticisms by deploying 'civilian human shields'. It started to list all good deeds and credits on its own ledger while throwing all debts on the civilian books. The script of current clash between civilian and military leaders was written long time ago.
Army is happy that judiciary is taking care of their main headache; President Zardari. Zardari's own credibility and popularity of less than single digit is not a mean achievement of the 'champions of democracy'. GHQ is careful not to overtly get involved in the political mess but happy to give signals to relevant parties at appropriate time to have some influence on the political scene post 2013 elections. PML-Q leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain remarked that "Those Q-League leaders who want to join PTI (Imran Khan's party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) will go through a dry-clean plant in Rawalpindi" referring to political engineering done by ISI. In the next few weeks, several politicians from all political parties flocked to PTI banner. Background of several of the politicians now joining PTI is well known and self interest may the guiding principle without any late night call from any military official. I'm not sure how much sugar military is putting in the PTI pot but involvement of half a dozen former intelligence officials in the affairs of PTI both overtly and covertly raises many suspicions. One report suggested that a secret committee consisting of former intelligence officials is 'dry cleaning' some of these familiar faces before launching them into PTI fold. If this is true it fits into the pattern as mediocre souls in the 'spooky world' have never been known for any finesse. Few years ago, NAB 'dry cleaned' a former PPP leader Aftab Ahmad Sher Khan Sherpao so speedily and he was inducted as interior minister in such a haste that NAB didn't have time to remove his name from the Exit Control List (ECL) maintained by none other than the interior ministry. A sad and ridiculous situation was created where country's sitting interior minister responsible for law and order of the land was on the ECL; prohibited from leaving the country as he was wanted in corruption cases. If after 2013 elections, it looks like that Imran Khan is essentially presiding PML-Q with new title and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) joins in as coalition partner then it will be quite clear that the major ingredients of the new wine were added in army's own brewery. However, one year can be an eternity as far as Pakistan's political prediction is concerned.
Party politics based on political manifesto and grass root organization is not established in Pakistani political system. Most parties are run by few families and many candidates get elected due to their own local influence. It is in this context that major political parties entice 'electable candidates' to their folds. Majority of politicians frequently change their party affiliations depending on power dynamics. In this background it is not surprising to see many familiar faces joining Imran Khan's PTI. PTI can now boast to have former foreign minister of General Mussharraf and former foreign minister of PPP in its folds. The supporters of these politicians call this 'pragmatism' and their opponents call it 'opportunism'. An important element of power politics is safeguarding self interest and it happens everywhere whether in first world or third world democracy.
The case of family of Shah Mahmood Qureshi is a good example of how this works. Qureshi's of Multan are hereditary custodians (Pirs) of two important shrines of Shah Rukn-e-Alam and Bahauddin Zakariya. In southern and western Punjab this populist Islam has been part of the local culture and custodians of shrines have lived on the tribute paid by the disciples. During British Raj a unique experiment was done where Pirs were welded to the landed gentry by award of large land grants. This was further cemented by intermarriages between Syed Pirs and tribal landed aristocracy; twin pillars of rural elite. Mutual beneficial relationship between the state and rural elites strengthened the bonds and retarded political consciousness. In addition to religious and economic resources, they were also inducted into administration first as honorary magistrates and tehsildars and later with introduction of electoral politics secured important positions in municipal committees and provincial legislature. Their leadership was secured due to hold on spiritual, economic and administrative domains. Combination of a number of factors have gradually eroded influence of many traditional rural elites but in some areas they are still local power holders.
Qureshi's ancestor and name sake Shah Mahmood Qureshi supported British during 1857 rebellion and victory of British ensured state patronage that continued for almost a century. Shah Mahmood's father Sajad Hussain Qureshi joined Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during latter's meteoric rise in early 1970s. When Bhutto was overthrown and later hanged by General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, elder Qureshi joined Zia ul Haq and was appointed Governor of Punjab province. Shah Mahmood was elected in 1985 in non-party based elections and then joined PML-Junejo group which was B-team of General Zia. After Zia's death, he joined PML-N and served as provincial minister under Nawaz Sharif. When Sharif's rival Manzoor Watto became Chief Minister, Shah Mahmood jumped on the new wagon and was appointed provincial Finance Minister. In 1993, when PPP came to power, he joined Benazir Bhutto and appointed Minister of State. In 1997 when he lost national assembly election, he was happy to serve as district Nazim of Multan. He served as president of PPP in Punjab and after winning elections on PPP ticket in 2008, he was hoping to get the top slot of Prime Minister but was given foreign minister portfolio. When he was downgraded further and offered Water and Power ministry, he called it quits and left PPP. The new rising star of PTI gave him new hope and in a dramatic turn of events immediately after joining the party he was appointed Vice Chairman essentially number two to Imran Khan. In view of significant local influence, when such politicians switch parties and jump on new ships, they don't start from the boiler room and work their way up. They immediately get access to the 'Captain's Deck' and Qureshi's case in nothing new as far as Pakistani politics is concerned.
The surge of youth prompted almost all old politicians to launch their young sons and daughters into the field. Shah Mahmood's son Zain Qureshi (he served as Legislative assistant to Senator John Kerry when his father was foreign minister) along with many other young scions of old families have joined PTI. Two sons of former President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari and grandson of Pir of Pagara have jumped on PTI train that is picking up steam and racing towards Islamabad. If this is the change then only God Almighty knows the meaning of status quo.
Imran Khan is sincere and wants to solve many problems but like other parties the whole party revolves around his personality and no sustainable grassroots organization exists. He can not wait any longer and feels that his time has come. It is this factor that forced him to accept 'electable entities' in his party. The biggest asset for Imran is that he is starting with clean slate and he does not have any political baggage and people may be willing to give him a chance. He has given hope to general public and this is a big plus as country needs a positive approach. However, this needs to be carefully calibrated as 'Messiah complex' both on part of the public and the leader risks a deep disappointment and despair. Country's problems are complex and deep rooted and it will take a lot of hard work and sacrifices as well as time to address the issues of collapsing economy, energy crisis, law and order and severe strain on all segments of the society.
Careful balance between populist slogans and clear understanding of challenges is must and while giving hope for better future a good dose of reality needs to be communicated to general public. Two major political parties PPP and PML-N will try to counter PTI by accusing it of taking 'turncoats' into its fold at the behest of the establishment. If large numbers of party tickets are awarded to these old hands, it may cause enough dejection among party's main base of youth. If this apathy is significant enough to keep them away from the polling stations, then PPP and PML-N can hope to tackle rival candidates at their own merits. On the other hand if Imran is able to have a careful balance by giving fifty percent of tickets to 'familiar faces' allowing them to use their personal influence in the constituencies and asking them to keep a low profile overall. The other fifty percent tickets are awarded to younger middle class candidates and keeping them in the media limelight. He may be able to win the first round with this strategy although the real test will be once he sits on the throne of thorns.
Real threats to Imran are not from 'usual suspects'. He has been careful so far and he is fighting only on one front and that is political with almost exclusive focus on corruption of politicians. He has been quite on militancy as well as role of army in country's affairs. Only when accusations of 'establishment's support' are hurled at him, he responds by stating that he will rein in ISI and not allow generals to call the shots. It is easier said than done. For the uninitiated the example of late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto should be enough. Bhutto learned his political skills by calling country's dictator Field Marshal Ayub Khan 'daddy'. He came to power in the aftermath of humiliating defeat of the army when army's stock was lowest and his own powers unchecked as Civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator. He also had the legitimacy of winning the majority of the seats in the remaining Pakistan. At the pinnacle of his power he publicly ridiculed senior generals and in his usual abrasive style insulted many. One general sent an application for extension of his service and Bhutto while approving wrote in his own handwriting on the general's file 'let the bastard die with his boots on'. In less than six years, military removed him from power and hanged him.
In current circumstances, Army's hope is that even if Imran comes in with decent majority, known entities now in PTI will have a sobering effect. Most of these politicians have either directly worked with the military or have background channels with GHQ therefore their advice will be to work with the military. Current circumstances of the country including over stretch of the military fighting insurgencies, lot of pressure from below especially from junior officers, open media and assertive judiciary are not conducive for overt military involvement. Military brass will be perfectly comfortable with the set up where it has the veto power over certain decisions while letting the civilian leaders take all the heat due to growing number of problems faced by the country. The momentum is in Imran Khan's favor and it depends on how he handles his new role.
The risk of assassination is a clear and present danger and in my view the probability of Imran dying unnatural death before next election is now over sixty percent. In that case the leadership of PTI will automatically shift to Shah Mahmood Qureshi and everybody will live happily after. Religious militant groups have no love lost for the 'contaminated' and 'polluted' Muslims. Their version of Sharia has no room for leadership role for people like Imran Khan. So far Imran has not openly criticized militants and if by mistake he opens this front before getting into the corridors of power or when faced with the reality of armed groups scattered allover the country after getting the levers of power will bring him in conflict with militants. In that case, militants will go for the decapitation and they have the will and the resources to achieve their aim in a very short period of time.
In Pakistan, very little attention has been paid to rapidly changing social scene. Social gulf is widening at an alarming rate and these social pressures are contributing to worsening law and order in the shape of increasing cadres for militant groups as well as violent crime. Regardless of the party or individual at the helm of the affairs, these social issues need urgent attention. I have not seen any serious research on social aspect of the militancy. Most Pakistanis simply label them as angry, misguided and criminal element, on the payroll of some foreign country or a reaction to U.S. policy in the region but completely ignore the social aspect. The case of Swat is particularly alarming where youth of poor, marginalized and disenfranchised Gujar community provided the bulk of foot soldiers to the meteoric rise of local militant commander Mullah Fazlullah. The core agenda of Fazlullah was not any extra territorial ambitions but overthrow of the existing local order and he promised these youth a better future under his guidance no matter how misguided. Underlying anger and hatred manifested in the form of extreme forms of brutalities perpetrated on Swatis especially on those seen as part of the existing order; land holding elite, police, pirs etc. Existing order was preserved only when state came in with a very heavy coercive arm resulting in thinning of the militant ranks. Coercion is an essential element in extreme situations but coercion alone will not do the trick as underlying serious social problems need to be addressed. Similar trends are visible in southern Punjab and if not addressed in a timely fashion can cause serious troubles for the state down the road.
In different parts of the country, these social stresses generate violence under different banners. The boundaries between power, politics, economic disparity and criminality are blurred. In Pushtun belts of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa, it is visible in the form of religious militancy, in southern and western Punjab as sectarian violence, in Karachi the platform is linguistic and in Baluchistan it is visible as ethnicity based insurgency. This is the real challenge for rulers of Pakistan no matter of what political or ideological persuasion.
Differences of opinion about any given policy is norm and even in well established democracies there is some friction between civilian and military leaders. A minimum working relationship with the spirit of compromise is must to avoid confrontations. This is the basic lesson Pakistani politicians and generals need to learn by heart. If civilian leaders insist on simply occupying the seats of power without any responsibility and generals insist on veto power over all issues, the country will stumble from crisis to crisis. If cabinet members happily serve as 'moles' for GHQ and army insists on using Military Secretaries to President and Prime Ministers as 'informants', the byzantine intrigues will continue. Civilians leaders should at least show the concern that they are trying to address serious problems and generals should stick to military matters. The least military brass can do is to stop detonating 'time bombs' under the seats of civilian rulers. If both civilians and generals can stay in their 'own lanes' that will be better not only for the country but their own institutions.
"Courage among civilized peoples consists in a readiness to sacrifice oneself for the political community." G.W. Hegel
Author thanks many for their valuable input although conclusions as well as all errors and omissions are author's sole responsibility.
Hamid Hussain
December 23, 2011
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