Messages In This Digest (16 Messages)

9.: [En/Ru] Turkmenistan looks eastward From: linguisticresearch

10.: Comprehensive legal analysis of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan From: linguisticresearch

11.: Russia's new military doctrine: more threats, smaller risks / Ru From: linguisticresearch

12.: NATO May Request More Azerbaijani Troops For Afghanistan From: Rick Rozoff

13.: State Department: Energy War And Death Of Post-Soviet CIS From: Rick Rozoff

14.: Chechen President: West Seeks To Destroy Russia Through Caucasus From: Rick Rozoff

15.: Afghanistan: NATO's Yearly Death Toll Exceeds 500 From: Rick Rozoff

16.: Observance Of International Law Or Global "Kosovization"? From: Rick Rozoff

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1.: End Of The Year: U.S. Recruits Worldwide For Afghan War

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:02 pm (PST)

Stop NATO
December 23, 2009

End Of The Year: U.S. Recruits Worldwide For Afghan War
Rick Rozoff

The first of 33,000 more U.S. troops have arrived in Afghanistan for a Christmas surge and they will soon be joined by as many as 10,000 additional non-American troops serving under NATO in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Washington will have over 100,000 uniformed personnel and tens of thousands of new military contractors in the South Asian war zone, and with more than 50,000 other NATO and NATO partner forces present total troop strength will exceed 150,000.

Except for a modest amount of troops assigned to the NATO Training Mission - Iraq in Baghdad, the U.S. with its 120,000 troops is now largely alone in that country. NATO, especially new NATO, member and candidate states were ordered to transfer their forces from Iraq to Afghanistan starting approximately a year ago and are now redeploying soldiers from missions in Kosovo, Lebanon and Chad to the same destination. The Afghan battlefront, then, currently has the largest amount of military forces stationed in any war zone in the world. [1]

Troops from NATO countries stationed in Bosnia, the Central African Republic, Chad, Lebanon and off the coast of Somalia are currently assigned to European Union missions (European warships also participate in NATO's Ocean Shield naval interdiction in Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden) and their transfer to the South Asian war front indicates the virtual interchangeability of armed units assigned to NATO and the European Union. [2]

Since the beginning of this year's escalation of the war in Afghanistan and into neighboring Pakistan, Western public figures and media have dwelt frequently and at length on the war being a - or the - test for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ostensibly the major watershed and crucible in its 60-year history.

When the bloc, the world's only military alliance, invoked its Article 5 mutual assistance clause in September of 2001 to support its leading member, the U.S., in its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Alliance was fresh on the heels of its first-ever war: The 78-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in early 1999, the first all-out military assault targeting a European nation since Hitler's and Mussolini's attacks and invasions of 1939-1941.

By activating Article 5 - "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all [and] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith" - NATO enlisted for its first land war and its first war in Asia.

It also exploited its effective war provision to launch Operation Active Endeavor in early October of 2001, a comprehensive, airtight naval surveillance and interdiction program throughout the entire Mediterranean Sea that monitors all activity in NATO's new mare nostrum (our sea) and dominates all access points into the world's most important sea: The Strait of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles Strait and the Suez Canal, connecting the Mediterranean with the Atlantic Ocean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea and thence to the Indian Ocean, respectively.

The U.S.-led military alliance gained control over that vast stretch of strategic waterways by adopting the American post-September 11, 2001 pretexts of combating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The first was the rationale for invading Afghanistan, the second for invading Iraq.

Three years after the inauguration of Active Endeavor, which continues with full force to this day, the NATO summit in Turkey developed the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative which upgraded military partnerships with the members of the bloc's Mediterranean Dialogue - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia - and targeted the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - for a similar relationship, one modeled on the Partnership for Peace program that prepared twelve Eastern European nations for accession to full NATO membership over the last decade. [3]

In ten years the military bloc has expanded from its Cold War confines, North America and Western and Southern Europe, into almost all of Eastern Europe including former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet and Yugoslav republics. The bipolar military division of Europe symbolized by the Berlin Wall [4] that ended twenty years ago has been replaced by a unilateral expansion of the world's sole military bloc toward Russia's western borders, from the Baltic to the Black to the Adriatic Seas. From there it has extended its reach through deployments and partnerships into the South Caucasus, Northeastern and Central Africa, and Central and South Asia.

If Afghanistan is a trial or the test of NATO in its sixtieth year, it is not so for the NATO of 1949 but of what leading Alliance officials and other proponents in recent years have referred to as 21st century NATO, expeditionary NATO, global NATO: The first attempt in history to forge an international military alliance. An international armed network with the world's self-proclaimed exclusive superpower and its nuclear arsenal as its foundation and at its core.

The "asymmetric" war in Afghanistan now in its ninth year is a seminal venture for NATO in several respects. In addition to it signifying the bloc's first ground war and its first colonial excursion outside the Euro-Atlantic world, the drawn-out and by all indications indefinite campaign in South Asia is laboratory and training camp, firing range and convergence point for the U.S.'s consolidation of a global military strike and occupation force first tested in Kosovo in 1999 with 50,000 troops under NATO command, then in Iraq after 2003 with tens of thousands of troops from NATO, new NATO and NATO candidate nations. [5]

Washington and Brussels have now dragooned armed contingents from fifty nations on five continents to serve under one commander, General Stanley McChrystal, head of all U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. New contributing states include geographically remote and otherwise diverse countries that include Colombia, Bosnia, Georgia, Montenegro, Mongolia, Armenia and South Korea. All except Mongolia either are or have recently been the scenes of wars or at any moment may be. As numerous statements by political and military leaders of nations supplying troops to NATO for the Afghan war have established, that battleground is an ideal location and opportunity for gaining real-life combat experience for application at home. The bulk of countries in this category border Russia on the latter's northwestern and southwestern flanks. [6]

The defense minister of Austria, one of only a small number of European nations now yet a full NATO member, recently lamented that American officials were pressuring his country to provide more troops for deployment to Afghanistan, having to remind readers of one of his country's newspapers that his is still a sovereign state. As reported in Deutsche Welle, "Austria and the United States are quarreling over Austria's troop levels in Afghanistan. The Austrian government says it feels strong pressure from the US to send more of its troops to the NATO mission."

The South Korean daily Dong-A Ilbo wrote on December 21 that "NATO has invited for the first time a Korean military delegation to a meeting next year of countries sending troops to Afghanistan.

"The dispatch of Korean troops scheduled for July will likely help expedite
far-reaching military cooperation between Korea and NATO." The source added that with the advent of the new Lee Myung-bak government in Seoul "As Korea actively participates in international security cooperation, including its decision to send troops to Afghanistan and fully join the Proliferation Security Initiative, NATO's assessment of Korea is changing." The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a another mechanism, linked with the U.S. thousand-ship navy project as well as NATO's Operation Active Endeavor, to enmesh more and more nations around the world into an international military network run from Washington. [7]

South Korea is already what is identified by NATO as a Contact Country partner, the others being Japan, Australia and New Zealand, serving as the foundation stones for a rapidly emerging "Asian NATO" that includes Singapore and Mongolia - both of whom have or will have troops serving under NATO for the first time, in Afghanistan - as well as the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei and future prospects like India, Bangladesh and Cambodia and the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. [8]

While advancing eastward, the North Atlantic bloc has also moved south and has begun to formally penetrate Africa, with an air transport mission to the Darfur region of Sudan in 2005 and naval deployments off Somalia in the Horn of Africa beginning in 2007.

Washington's mainstay military ally in South and all of Latin America, Colombia, in addition to turning over seven military bases to the Pentagon in a move that could ignite a war with its neighbors Venezuela and Ecuador, is sending a company of battle-hardened U.S.-trained combat troops to Afghanistan for NATO's ISAF mission. They will bring their own wartime experience to bear in the South Asian nation and will return home, like their Georgian and South Korean military counterparts, also trained by the U.S., better prepared for armed conflict against neighboring states.

In addition to Britain, France and the Netherlands being obligated to lend their colonial possessions in Latin America and off its coasts to their U.S. NATO ally for use against Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) members Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela (post-coup Honduras is withdrawing), steps have been taken over the past fifteen years to expand NATO ties with other Latin American nations as well as Colombia. [9]

In 1995 Chile and Argentina (under President Carlos Menem) sent troops to serve under NATO in Bosnia, the Alliance's first military deployment outside a member state's territory. This week Chile agreed to prolong the stationing of troops there - the mission since having been transferred from NATO to the European Union - with a government official stating, "We have been able to see Chile together with the North Atlantic Treaty organization in a European country, and the interaction of our armed forces with first-level armies of the world." [10]

The war and war zone trajectory for NATO candidates and partner states over the past fifteen years has been from Bosnia to Kosovo to Macedonia to Iraq and finally Afghanistan. Chilean armed forces, whoever wins next month's presidential run-off election, may eventually be sent to Afghanistan.

Solidifying ties with Chile, which is involved in the current multinational dispute over claims in the Antarctic, and with South Africa, where NATO warships and have docked and conducted naval exercises over the past two years, in addition to Australia which has the largest non-member troop contingent serving under NATO in Afghanistan, the Alliance is positioning itself for the scramble at the southern end of the planet [11] as it is for that at the top of the world. [12]

Two months before the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the effective end of the Cold War, the triennial summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Present were the representatives of 108 nations that defined themselves as militarily non-aligned.

Twenty years later, and with over twenty more countries in the world after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia itself and the independence of East Timor, the pressure to join in military agreements, partnerships, deployments, exercises and base hosting with the U.S. and NATO is more intense than during the Cold War.

The newly activated U.S. Africa Command alone targets 53 nations for individual and collective partnerships with the Pentagon. The war in Afghanistan is the broadest global touchstone to date in this militarization of the world. Washington is pressuring all and sundry to contribute with troops, logistics and funds and is employing the war to build up bilateral military ties and weapons and warfighting interoperability with nations throughout the world.

The first decade of the new millennium has been one of war, starting in earnest in Afghanistan, and the expansion of American bases and troops into Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South America, and Central and South Asia. Areas that until now had been spared the Pentagon's permanent presence.

1) U.S., NATO Poised For Most Massive War In Afghanistan's History
Stop NATO, September 24, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/24/u-s-nato-poised-for-most-massive-war-in-afghanistans-history
2) EU, NATO, US: 21st Century Alliance For Global Domination
Stop NATO, February 19, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/eu-nato-us-21st-century-alliance-for-global-domination
3) NATO In Persian Gulf: From Third World War To Istanbul
Stop NATO, February 6, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/nato-in-persian-gulf-from-third-world-war-to-istanbul
4) 1989-2009: Moving The Berlin Wall To Russia's Borders
Stop NATO, November 7, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/11/07/1989-2009-berlin-wall-moves-to-russian-border
5) Afghan War: NATO Builds History's First Global Army
Stop NATO, August 9, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/01/afghan-war-nato-builds-historys-first-global-army
6) Afghan War: NATO Trains Finland, Sweden For Conflict With Russia
Stop NATO, July 26, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/01/afghan-war-nato-trains-finland-sweden-for-conflict-with-russia
7) Proliferation Security Initiative And U.S. 1,000-Ship Navy: Control Of
World's Oceans, Prelude To War
Stop NATO, January 29, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/proliferation-security-initiative-and-us-1000-ship-navy-control-of-worlds-oceans-prelude-to-war
8) Global Military Bloc: NATO's Drive Into Asia
Stop NATO, January 24, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/global-military-bloc-natos-drive-into-asia
U.S. Expands Asian NATO Against China, Russia
Stop NATO, October 16, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/10/16/u-s-expands-asian-nato-against-china-russia
9) Twenty Years After End Of The Cold War: Pentagon's Buildup In Latin
America
Stop NATO, November 4, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/11/04/stop-nato
10) Xinhua News Agency, December 22, 2009
11) NATO Of The South: Chile, South Africa, Australia, Antarctica
Stop NATO, May 30, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/31/nato-of-the-south-chile-south-africa-australia-antarctica
12) NATO's, Pentagon's New Strategic Battleground: The Arctic
Stop NATO, February 2, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/natos-pentagons-new-strategic-battleground-the-arctic
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2.: Taiwan: Raytheon Gets $1.1 Billion Advanced Patriot Missile Order

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:41 pm (PST)

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4432190&c=AME&s=AIR

Defense News
December 23, 2009

Raytheon Gets $1.1B Patriot Missile Systems Order From Taiwan
By ANTONIE BOESSENKOOL

-Configuration 3 is Raytheon's most advanced Patriot system and allows the use of Lockheed Martin's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles Raytheon's Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles and allows missile launchers to be placed miles in front of the radar of the system, rather than right next to the radar as in earlier Patriot systems.
-"We've been in Taiwan for 40 years. We are embedded (there) and are honored that they continue to trust Raytheon with the defense of their country."

Raytheon received a $1.1 billion order from Taiwan for new Patriot missile systems, Raytheon said Dec. 23.

The order for the four new Patriot fire units, made as a Foreign Military Sale, is a $966 million contract for ground-system hardware and a $134 million contract for spares. It will include new advances in technology, improved man-machine interface and reduced life-cycle costs, Raytheon said.

Raytheon already won smaller contracts for Taiwan in January 2009 and in 2008 for upgrades to the Patriot systems the country already had. Those contracts were to upgrade the systems to Configuration 3, the same upgrade the company is completing for the U.S. Army.

Configuration 3 is Raytheon's most advanced Patriot system and allows the use of Lockheed Martin's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles Raytheon's Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles and allows missile launchers to be placed miles in front of the radar of the system, rather than right next to the radar as in earlier Patriot systems.

The four new systems under the latest contract will be built as Configuration 3 systems, said Dan Smith, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems president.

"We've been in Taiwan for 40 years," Smith said. "We are embedded (there) and are honored that they continue to trust Raytheon with the defense of their country."

Twelve countries, including the U.S., are Patriot system customers. Raytheon is in discussions with customer countries that haven't yet upgraded to the Configuration-3 status, like Saudi Arabia, and is looking at adding new customers, like Turkey, which currently has a competition going for an air and missile defense system.

"With the countries that have not yet upgraded to the Config 3 baseline, we are in discussions with those countries, along with the U.S. Army, in terms of getting their plans in order to upgrade to the baseline for all nations," Smith said.

Raytheon, based in Tewksbury, Mass., is the prime contractor for Patriot air and missile defense systems and system integrator for PAC-3 missiles.
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3.: Lockheed To Provide Morocco With 24 F-16 Warplanes

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:43 pm (PST)

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4431184&c=MID&s=AIR

Agence France-Presse
December 23, 2009

Advertisement$842M Deal: Lockheed To Build 24 F-16s For Morocco

WASHINGTON: Lockheed Martin is being awarded an $841.9 million contract to produce 24 F-16 aircraft for Morocco, which ordered the jets in 2008, the Pentagon said Dec. 22.

Lockheed also won contracts to supply the Pentagon with "advanced counter measure system electronic warfare system, along with associated support equipment, alternate mission equipment and support elements," the Pentagon said in a statement.

The total value of the contract between the United States and Morocco is estimated about $2.4 billion, not all of which will be handled by Lockheed.

Other firms that manufacture or supply parts and equipment or can train technicians will share in the contract.

The Rafale jet produced by France's Dassault was among those that competed for the Moroccan contract.

Dassault has yet to sell any of the aircraft abroad, but French Defense Minister Herve Morin said last week he remained "resolutely optimistic" about the possibilities of exporting Rafale, Dassault Aviation's "multirole" combat jet.

"We are having advanced discussion with the United Arab Emirates, Brazil and also other partners," Morin told France's La Tribune newspaper.
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4.: NATO Chief Hails Troops Deployed In Three Continents, Middle East

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:45 pm (PST)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-19F97846-75F1D222/natolive/opinions_60515.htm?

NATO
December 22, 2009

Secretary General's end of year message to NATO-led forces deployed on operations

-I should like you to know that whether you are deployed in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, in Iraq, on the Mediterranean Sea, or on the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa, my thoughts are very much with you.

As we approach the holiday season and the end of 2009, I should like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you who are deployed on NATO-led missions and operations....

You, the armed forces, and the many civilians who support you, are demonstrating in the clearest possible way the Alliance's solidarity....

I realise full well that the Alliance's commitment comes with a price. Some of your colleagues have lost their life or suffered serious injuries during the course of their duties. My thoughts are very much with the families and loved ones of those who have paid the highest price, as well as with those who have been injured and those who are caring for them.

It is understandable that in this festive season, you would wish to be at home with your families and loved ones. To those of you whose duties on behalf of the Alliance make this impossible, I should like you to know that whether you are deployed in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, in Iraq, on the Mediterranean Sea, or on the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa, my thoughts are very much with you.

I thank you all and send you my very best wishes for this holiday and for the New Year.
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5.: Ex-Bush Official Named Obama Cybersecurity Chief

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:48 pm (PST)

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4430052&c=AME&s=TOP

Defense News
December 22, 2009

Ex-Bush Official Named Cybersecurity Czar
By GREGG CARLSTROM

Howard Schmidt, the Bush administration's cybersecurity chief and a former executive at eBay and Microsoft, will serve as the White House's first cybersecurity coordinator, U.S. President Barack Obama announced Dec. 22.

Schmidt's appointment ends a nearly eight-month search for a "cybersecurity czar." Obama announced the new position in May during a White House speech on cybersecurity, but he struggled to find someone willing to take the job; several possible candidates reportedly backed out because of concerns the new position won't have enough authority.

The White House said Schmidt's long experience working with the private sector was a key factor in the president's decision. Schmidt has worked as Microsoft's chief security officer and eBay's chief information officer; he also sits on McAfee's advisory council. Schmidt is currently the CEO of the Information Security Forum.

"Howard is one of the world's leading authorities on computer security, with some 40 years of experience in government, business and law enforcement," said John Brennan, the counterterrorism chief on the National Security Council. "Howard will have regular access to the president and serve as a key member of his national security staff."

Schmidt will serve on the NSC and report to Brennan. Lawrence Summers, the head of the National Economic Council, also wanted direct authority over the "cybersecurity czar," calling cybersecurity a matter of economic security....

Brennan said Dec. 22 that Schmidt will "work closely" with the National Economic Council. A spokesman for the White House, Nick Shapiro, confirmed that Schmidt will not report directly to the NEC - and said there wouldn't be tension between the two councils.

"Cybersecurity and economic innovation are mutually reinforcing. Strong cybersecurity, baked in from the beginning, enables innovation to succeed and ensures that the platforms for innovation are resilient," Shapiro said. "The fact that the coordinator participates in both national security and economic discussions strengthens the position."

Schmidt will be tasked with coordinating cybersecurity policy across the federal government. He will also run a new White House cybersecurity office and push to implement the recommendations of a 60-day cybersecurity review unveiled in May. The review was led by Melissa Hathaway, an adviser to the director of national intelligence.
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6.: Afghan War: 6,000 More U.S. Troops Get Christmas Call-Up

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:50 pm (PST)

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/12/army_afghan_more_deploy_122209w/

Army Times
December 23, 2009

Another 6,000 get orders to Afghanistan
By Gina Cavallaro

An additional 6,000 support and combat troops have received orders to deploy to Afghanistan, the latest call-up of U.S. troops that will form part of a 30,000-troop increase in country.

About 3,400 soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team will deploy from Fort Campbell, Ky., during early summer, according to a Defense Department announcement, which also stated that another 2,600 support forces will deploy at various times during 2010.

The deployment of these soldiers is in addition to 6,000 soldiers who got orders following the Nov. 30 announcement by President Barack Obama that he would send reinforcements to Afghanistan.
===========================
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7.: Spanish Troops Kill, Wound Afghan Civilians

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:55 pm (PST)

http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=114519&sectionid=351020403

Press TV
December 23, 2009

Afghan civilian killed by Spanish fire

An Afghan civilian has been killed and another wounded in Western Afghanistan after Spanish troops fired at them, the Spanish military confirmed.

The Spanish defense ministry said the troops opened fire on the two Afghans near Herat Province on Wednesday.

The ministry claimed that its soldiers believed the Afghans wanted to attack their convoy when they did not stop their motorcycle after the first and second warning shots.
....
More than 1,200 Spanish troops are currently serving with NATO-led forces in Afghanistan.

Foreign forces in Afghanistan are under fire for attacks leading to civilian casualties.
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8.: NATO Commitment: Czech Military To Buy 90 Amored Vehicles

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Wed Dec 23, 2009 8:22 pm (PST)

http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9CP4IMO0.htm

BusinessWeek
December 23, 2009

Czech military to get 90 Iveco armored vehicles

PRAGUE: The Czech Defense Ministry says it has concluded a deal to buy 90 armored vehicles for the military from Italy's Iveco.

The ministry says the 90 Iveco M65E 19 WM 4x4 vehicles will be delivered between 2010-2013 in a deal worth 3.6 billion koruna ($195 million).

The ministry said in a statement Wednesday the vehicles will be used in the military's foreign missions as well as in the fight against terrorism.

The Czech Republic currently has a 480-strong unit as part of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan and 550 Czech troops are with the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.
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9.: [En/Ru] Turkmenistan looks eastward

Posted by: "linguisticresearch" LinguisticResearch@gmx.de

Wed Dec 23, 2009 8:28 pm (PST)

http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2662

22.12.2009
Aleksandr SHUSTOV
*Turkmenistan looks eastward *

The launch of a new gas pipe on December 14 to connect Turkmenistan and
China became one of the key moments in a geopolitical game aimed to win
new routes of exporting Central Asian oil and gas resources. The
launching ceremony for the gas pipe took place at the Samandep field in
Turkmenistan and was attended by Presidents Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov,
Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan) and Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan). The
new gas pipe will be the first route to deliver the Turkmen gas (up to
40 bln cubic meters per year) to external markets bypassing Russia.
Until recently Russia has purchased the lion's share of Turkmen gas but
now it plans to buy four times less.

The new pipe is expected to supply to China 150 million cubic meters of
gas, but it will reach full capacity by 2012. It will pump gas mainly
from the gas fields located on the left bank of the Amu Darya River,
while the lacking amounts of gas will be taken from the Bagtyyarlyk
gas-rich territory on contract basis. The pipeline is about 7 km long,
with 184,5 km being on the Turkmen soil, and 490 km, 1300 km and 4500 km
in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China respectively.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, thanks to their geographical location, have
become important transit countries in the project. And since the deal
was reached for 30 years, countries of Central Asia and China are now
guaranteed with developed gas transit infrastructure.

Notably, the Kazakh leg of the pipeline was launched before the whole
pipeline was commissioned. On December 12 Chinese President Hu Jintao
and his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev attended a solemn
ceremony of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipe. According to Kazakh sources,
it will not only supply the Turkmen gas to China but will also improve
gas supplies in the Zhambyl, South-Kazakh and Alma-Ata regions. In
August 2007 KazMunaiGazom and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) signed a $6.7 bln deal to build the Kazakh leg of the pipeline.
The opening of this section stressed Kazakhstan`s key role as a transit
country.

The launch of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline took place amid a gas
row between Russia and Turkmenistan caused by an incident at the Central
Asia-Center gas pipe this April- which yet has not settled because of
the price for the Turkmen gas. Under the contract, it should be $375 per
1,000 cubic meters (to meet a European level). But amid a drop in demand
and gas prices in Europe, Gazprom found it non-lucrative to purchase gas
at such low tariffs and thus had to ask Turkmenistan to lower prices as
well. In response Ashkhabad demanded that Moscow observed all terms of
the contract, and thus the conflict broke out. Neither President
Medvedev nor Berdymuhamedov managed to settle the differences during
their meetings in Moscow and Askhabad in autumn.

On November 24, the Vedomosti reported citing 'resources in Gazprom'
that in 2010-2012 Russia plans to buy four times less gas from
Turkmenistan. The newspaper provided the figures: in the aforementioned
period of time Gazprom will reduce the amounts twice: from 66,1bln cubic
meters in 2008 to 34 bln cubic meters in 2009-2011 ad 37.9 bln in 2012.
Thus Turkmenistan will be able to sell no more than 10.5 bln cubic
meters of gas per year, which is four times less than in 2007-2008. At
the same time, Russia is going to buy more gas from Uzbekistan- 14,5bln
cubic meters by 2012. Thus, Uzbekistan will outrun Turkmenistan that
used to supply 80% of all Central Asian gas to Russia.

Gazprom plans that in 2010 the price of the Turkmen gas will be the
lowest in the Caspian basin. A purchasing price for the Turkmen gas is
expected at $222 per 1000 cubic meters, and $230 and $244,5 for the
Kazakh and the Azeri gas. Gas from Uzbekistan will be the cheapest-
$220. Experts think this price will suit Turkmenistan because-allowing
for the transit-it will be about $300. But for Gazprom it is still
unprofitable to buy gas from Turkmenistan, and the only reason why
Russia has to do it is its intention not to leave gas which could be
used in alternative gas pipes, and first of all in the Nabucco project.

Turkmenistan plans to compensate losses in cooperation with Russia with
the help from Iran and China. Apart from the Chinese pipeline, the
republic plans to increase by three times exports to Iran through
boosting transit capacity of the existing Iranian gas route up to 14 bln
cubic meters per year, and also by launching another gas pipeline in
December. In 2010 it is expected to supply to Iran 6 bln cubic meters of
gas, and the amounts might be twice as big in the following years. In
case Gazprom buys less gas from Turkmenistan, Iran will become the
second outlet (after China) for the Turkmen gas.

Regarding price policy, the Chinese gas pipeline will hardly replace
cooperation with Russia. Though Ashkhabad and Beijing have not yet
agreed on the final export price, some reports say it may be $100-130
per 1,000 cubic meters on the Turkmen-Uzbek border, which is at least
twice less than that offered by Gazprom. Obviously, as a monopolist
among the buyers, China may become for Turkmenistan as inconvenient
partner as once Gazprom was. In addition, three years are left until the
gas pipe reaches its full capacity in 2012, and during this period of
time the Turkmen budget will suffer serious losses.

The launch of the Chinese gas pipe may affect the implementation of
other projects competing in Turkmenistan- the Caspian gas pipe and
Nabucco. If Gazprom cuts purchase of the Turkmen gas, the construction
of the Caspian pipe will be unnecessary. Besides, the Central
Asia-Center gas pipeline, which has been used to deliver gas from
Turkmenistan, will remain underloaded. However, the West is optimistic
about Nabucco. Consortium members think a conflict between Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan over oil and gas fields in the Caspian basin will be
over which will allow to receive at least 10 bln cubic meters of gas
from Turkmenistan via the planned trans-Caspian pipe.

When Russia's positions on the Central Asian energy market are
weakening, and Turkmenistan is running the risk of losing an outlet,
both sides are in search for a compromise. This is what the forthcoming
visit of President Medvedev to Ashkhabad in late December is all about.
The talks will definitely determine the future of Russia-Turkmen energy
cooperation.

---------------------------

http://fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2662

18.12.2009
????????? ??????
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?????? ????????? ???????? ???????????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ??
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?????????? ?? ????????????? ????????? ?????????? ??????? ?????????????.
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???????????? ??????? (?? 40 ????. ?????????? ? ???) ????? ????????????
?? ??????? ????? ? ????? ?????????? ??????. ??? ???? ???? ??????, ?? ???
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??? ????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ? ?????? ????.

? ??????? ????? ???? ? ????? ????? ?????????? 150 ???. ?????????? ????,
? ?? ????????? ???????? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ? 2012 ?. ??? ???????
????????? ????? ????? ????????????? ??????????? ????????, ? ???????????
?????? ????? ???????? ?? ?????????????? ?????????? ??????????
«??????????». ????? ????????????? ???????????? ?????????? ????? 7 ???.
??. ??? ???? ?? ?????????? ????????? ??? ????? ?????????? ????? 184,5
??, ? ??????? ????? ???????????? ???????? ?? ?????????? ??????????? (490
??), ?????????? (1300 ??) ? ?????? ????? (4500 ??).

???????? ?? ??, ??? ???????? ????????? ???? ???????????? ??????????? ?
?????????, ?????????? ? ?????????, ????????? ?????? ???????????????
?????????, ????? ??????? ??????????? ????????. ????????? ?? ???????? ??
??????? ? ????? ???????????? ???? ????? ???????????? ????????, ??????
??????????? ?? 30 ???, ?????? ??????????? ???? ? ??? ???????? ???????
?????????? ????? ???????????????? ???????????????.

?????????, ??? ??? ?? ??????? ????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ???
?????????????? ???????. 12 ??????? ???????????? ??? ?? ???????? ?
????????? ?????????? ?. ????????? ???????????? ????????? ??????????
«????????? – ?????». ?? ?????????? ????????????? ???????, ?? ?? ??????
????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ???? ? ???, ?? ?
???????? ???????? ????????????? ??????????, ????-????????????? ?
????-???????? ????????. ????????? ?????????????? ??????? ???????????,
?????????? ? ????????????? ???????? ????? «?????????????» ? ?????????
???????????? ???????????? ??????????? (CNPC) ???? ????????? ? ???????
2007 ?., ????????? 6,7 ????. ????. ???????? ?????????????? ???????,
???????????? ?????? ????? ???????????, ??????????? ?????? ?????????? ???
???????? ?????????? ??????, ?????????? ?? ????? ??????????? ????? ???????.

?????? ??????????? ???????????? – ?????????? – ????????? – ?????
????????? ?? ???? ?????????-???????????? ???????? ?????????, ???????????
? ?????? ?? ??????????? «??????? ???? – ?????» ? ?????? ????? ???? ? ??
???????????????? ?? ??? ???. ?????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ??
??????????? ???. ???????? ???????? ?????????, ??? ?????? ?????????? $375
?? 1 ?????? ??????????, ???????????? ???????????? ??????. ?????? ?
???????? ????????????? ??????? ?????? ? ??? ?? ??? ? ?????? ???????? ???
?? ????? ??????? «????????» ????? ?????????, ??? ? ???????? ???
?????????? ????????? ????? ?? ???????? ????. ??????? ?? ??????????
?????????? ???? ??????? ?????????, ?????? ???????? ????????.
????????????? ??? ???????? ?? ????? ????????????? ?????? ?????????? ??
?. ????????? ? ???????, ? ????? ?????????? ????????????? ? ??????
?????????????? ?????? ?. ???????????????? ? ?????? ???? ?? ???????.

????? ????, 24 ?????? «?????????», ??????????? ?? ?????????? «??????? ?
«????????» ??????????», ????????, ??? ? ??????? 2010-2012 ??. ??????????
???????? ????????? ? 4 ???? ????????? ??????? ???? ? ?????????. ??
????????? ??????, ?????????????? «?????????» ??????? ?? ???????? ???? ?
??????????????????? ??????? ??????????????? ?????????? ?? ??????? ? 2
???? – ? 66,1 ????. ?????????? ? 2008 ?. ?? 33-34 ????. ?????????? ?
2009-2011 ??. ? 37,9 ????. ? 2012 ?. ???????? «????????????» ???????
????? ?????????, ? ??????? ??????????? ???????? ?? ????? 10,5 ????.
?????????? ???? ? ???, ??? ? 4 ???? ?????? ?????? 2007-2008 ??. ??? ????
??????? ?????????? ???? ? 2012 ?. ?????????? ?? ????????? ? 2008 ?. ??
2% ? ???????? 14,5 ????. ??????????. ? ????? ?? ??????? ???????? ????
?????????? ??????? ?????????, ??????? ????? ?????????? ?????? 80% ?????
???????????????? ????.

??? ???? ???? ??????????? ? ????????? ???? ? 2010 ?., ???????? ??????
«????????», ????? ????? ?? ????? ?????? ? ?????????? ????????. ????
?????????? ????????? ???????????? ???? ???????? 222 ????. ?? 1 ??????
??????????, ?? ?????????????? – 230 ????., ? ???????????????? - 244,5
????. ??????? ???????????? «????????» ????????? ?????? ????????? ???,
????????? ???????? ?? ????????? «????????» ???????? 220 ????. ?? ??????
?????????, ????? ???? ?????? ???????? ?????????, ??? ??? ?? ???????
???????? ?? ??????? ??? ?????? ????????????? ????????????????? (?????
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??-???????? ???????? ???????????????, ? ???????????? ???????,
???????????? ???????? ???? ?? ???, ????????? ??????? ????????? ?????????
? ?????????? ?????? ???, ??????? ????? ???? ?? ????????? ???????????? ?
??????? ?????????????? ??????????? ? ?????? ?????, ???????, «???????».

?????????????? ?????? ?? ?????????? ??????????? ????????? ????????????
?? ???? ????? ? ?????. ?????? ??????? ?????????? ??????????? ??????????
????????? ??? ??????? ? 3 ???? ????????? ??????? ?????? ???? ? ????. ???
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????????? ???????????, ?????? ?? ?? 14 ????. ?????????? ? ???, ? ?????
????????? ? ??????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ??????????. ? 2010 ?. ?? ????
??????????? ????????? ? ???? 6 ????. ?????????? ????, ? ? ???????????
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?????? ??????????? ? 2012 ?. ?? ?????? ????????? ???????? ???????? ?????
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????? ???????????? ??????.

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?? ?????????.

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?????? ? ???? ?????? ??????????????? ?? ????? ??????? ????? ? ??????? ?.
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??????????? ???????? ?????????????? ???? ?????.

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10.: Comprehensive legal analysis of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan

Posted by: "linguisticresearch" LinguisticResearch@gmx.de

Wed Dec 23, 2009 8:28 pm (PST)

http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346

International Law: The First Casualty of the Drone War

A comprehensive legal analysis of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan

December 12, 2009 By *Max Kantar*

Max Kantar's ZSpace Page <http://www.zmag.org/zspace/maxkantar>

Join ZSpace <https://www.zcommunications.org/zsustainers/signup>

*ABSTRACT. This report utilizes well-established principles of both
treaty and customary international law as a measuring stick for
attempting to determine the legal and moral legitimacy of the covert
U.S. policy of using drones to attack targets in Pakistan. This analysis
is unique in that it uses both broad assessments as well as pertinent
individual case studies with the purpose of chronicling the details of
several drone attacks over a period of 45 months in the interest of
legal evaluation. Drawing from a vast collection of reliable press
reports, independent human rights testimonies, and the most prominent,
mainstream studies, this report is quite possibly the most comprehensive
analysis on the topic to date and likely the first of its kind to appear
in the wake of the US-Pakistan drone controversy.*

For nearly four years, the United States has been using unmanned aerial
vehicles, also known as "drones," to repeatedly bomb targets in
Pakistan. <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn1>[1]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn1> The drone strikes,
operated primarily by the CIA, are reportedly launched with the
intention of killing top al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders and holding the
Pakistani government accountable. Since the Obama administration has
taken office, the U.S. campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan has
markedly intensified, consistent with the trends established in the
final eight months President Bush's second term. Although the bombings
of Pakistan fall into a much broader strategic U.S. policy in the
region, it is the purpose of this analysis to focus solely on the legal
implications and human costs of the drone strikes in Pakistan.
First I will review the existing reports entailing the legal
status—combatant or noncombatant—of those killed in U.S. attacks.
Secondly, I will provide a brief and basic overview of the laws of war
and their immediate applicability regarding the protection of civilians
and noncombatants in international armed conflicts in accordance with
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977, and
customary international law. Third, I will examine several case studies
of various U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan in order to determine whether
or not international law is being observed by United States. Fourth, I
will briefly evaluate the fundamental legal credibility underlying the
attacks using both the existing analyses provided by legal scholars and
rights groups and well-established principles of law rooted in the
Fourth Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Fifth, using the available body of documentary
evidence compiled by independent journalists, human rights groups,
strategic analysts, media reports, and legal experts, as well as taking
into consideration the basic tenets of international law in the context
of the U.S. attacks, I will juxtapose the substance of U.S. actions with
fundamental American legal standards with the purpose of establishing an
appropriate technical classification for the United States' drone policy
in Pakistan. Lastly, I will conclude this analysis with a few final
remarks addressing unanswered questions while also making some basic
recommendations.
I am going to argue the position that the United States is in violation
of international law on several counts in regards to its bombings of
Pakistan. Drawing on highly relevant and uncontroversial legal
precedents established by the International Criminal Court, I will argue
that strict adherence to even the most elementary standards of
international law would require criminal prosecution of several
high-level Bush and Obama administration officials ranging from the
state department to the CIA.
*_Casualty Reports and Assessments _*
The most cited and controversial report to date on the casualty results
of U.S. drone strikes is the April 2009 report published by Pakistan's
leading English daily, /The News/.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn2>[2]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn2> The report was
authored by Amir Mir who is known by leading American strategic analysts
as "a well-regarded Pakistani terrorism expert."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn3>[3]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn3> The report, relying
on internal Pakistani government sources, alleges that from January 14,
2006 to April 8, 2009, U.S. drone bombings killed 687 civilians and 14
al-Qaeda operatives, amounting to a ratio of nearly 50 civilians killed
for every al-Qaeda operative killed, or a 94% civilian death rate. Out
of 60 total strikes, only 10 hit any al-Qaeda targets. The sources
attributed the failed drone attacks to "faulty intelligence information"
which resulted in the "killing [of] hundreds of innocent civilians,
including women and children." It goes on to detail the numbers of
deaths, the statuses of the victims, and the dates of specific attacks,
all within annual and monthly time frames.
This report has since been cited and endorsed by several relevant and
mainstream commentators, despite the fact that it has been largely
ignored, or at best, marginalized and down-played, by the mainstream
media in the United States. Most notably, in a meeting with Congress
this past May, former senior counterinsurgency advisor to the U.S. Army,
David Kilcullen, told the U.S. government to "call off the drones"
noting that "since 2006, we've killed 14 senior Al Qaeda leaders using
drone strikes; in the same time period, we've killed 700 Pakistani
civilians in the same area." In a /New York Times/ article
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn4>[4]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn4> just weeks later,
Kilcullen co-authored an editorial with Andrew Exum—a Fellow at the
Center for a New American Security and a former Army officer who served
in both Iraq and Afghanistan—in which they cited the casualty ratio and
figures from /The News/' April 2009 report as evidence of the lack of
precision in the drone policy.[5]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn5>
The Brookings Institution published an analysis of the U.S. drone policy
in Pakistan last July.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn6>[6]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn6> The analysis, written
by Senior Fellow, Daniel Byman, concluded that despite the difficulty in
determining exact numbers of civilian casualties, it was likely that
"more than 600 civilians" have been killed by U.S. attacks at the time
of writing. "That number suggests," the report continued, "that for
every militant killed, 10 or so civilians also died." This assessment is
highly significant for multiple reasons. The centrist Brookings
Institution is arguably the most powerful and influential think tank in
the United States, as noted by the authoritative /Think Tank Index/
magazine. Brookings also routinely garners by far the most media
citations annually.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn7>[7]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn7> To say the least, it
is quite noteworthy that the most mainstream and establishment think
tank in the United States has gone on record saying that 90% of those
killed in U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan have been innocent civilians.
Two of America's leading counterterrorism experts, Peter Bergen and
Katherine Tiedemann, are the authors of the most recent analysis of
casualties resulting from U.S. drone strikes.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn8>[8]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn8> In their analysis,
Bergen and Tiedemann attempt to calculate the numbers of people killed
by U.S. drone strikes from January 2006 to October 19, 2009. For
documentation, the authors rely on "accounts from reliable media
organizations with substantial reporting capabilities in Pakistan."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn9>[9]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn9> Bergen and Tiedemann
ultimately conclude that between 757-1,012 people have been killed by
U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan, of which 252-316 (33-31%) are thought to
have been civilians. The Bergen-Tiedemann analysis, while ambitious and
certainly of some limited value, does in fact contain multiple, glaring
errors. The report cites two drone strikes (January and October) for the
year 2006 and concludes that no known civilians were killed in either
attack. For the January attack, the authors claim that 18
al-Qaeda/Taliban militants were killed by the drone strike and cite a
CNN report to justify their conclusions.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn10>[10]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn10> However, the CNN
report cited by the authors is dated July 29, 2008 and explicitly states
that the respective al-Qaeda operative—whom the article is about—was not
killed in 2006 (despite inaccurate reports at the time) but rather is
thought to have been killed over two years later in 2008.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn11>[11]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn11> While the July 2008
CNN report cited by Bergen and Tiedemann in fact makes no mention of
civilian deaths nor does it provide a casualty total for the January
2006 attack, it has long since been conceded that each of the 18 killed
in the January 2006 strike have been identified as civilians and no
al-Qaeda operatives were among the dead.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn12>[12]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn12>
In regards to the October 2006 strike in Bajaur province, the only
citation provided by the authors is either inaccessible or nonexistent;
however, it's irrelevant because the Pakistani newspaper, DAWN, covered
the strike in detail at the time and it subsequently contradicts the
authors' assertions that the 80+ people killed were militants.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn13>[13]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn13> When the
Bergen-Tiedemann findings are adjusted to correct their mistakes for
casualties in 2006, the civilian death toll becomes 352-416 or 46-41%
(respectively) of the total body count.
Furthermore, there appear to be significant gaps in the authors'
calculations of the range of civilians likely to have been killed in
drone strikes launched in the year 2009. For example, in appendix 1,
each drone strike documented details the number of people killed for
each of the following groups: Al Qaeda/Taliban leaders, Al-Qaeda/Taliban
(lower-level militants), and "others" which includes civilians and often
times, the total number killed in the particular attack. In the list of
strikes and casualties for the year of 2009, the total number of
"others" exceeds considerably the range of civilian deaths cited by the
authors for the same time period (see appendix 2) /even/ when the total
of the "others" is derived after subtracting the corresponding tallies
of militants and militant leaders (when the distinction is made). This
suggests that the authors are willing to, at times, assume that
unconfirmed, or rather, unidentified victims
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn14>[14]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn14> may be included in
the possible range of militants killed but not in the corresponding
civilian totality. These assumptions undermine the validity of Bergen
and Tiedemann's calculations for the year 2009 (of militant-civilian
ratios) and subsequently suggest that the number of civilian casualties
in 2009 may be significantly higher than conveyed by the numbers
produced by Bergen and Tiedemann. This problem is compounded by the fact
that of the 43 drone strikes launched in 2009 (up to October 19) in 12
cases, the number of people killed, as well as the legal status of the
victims, was "unknown"—due to no fault of the authors—and therefore
could not be factored into the ratio calculations at all.
For the years 2007 and 2008, the authors' findings, classifications, and
citations appear to be consistent with the available documentary record.
The rate of "unknown" casualties is also much lower for these periods.
It is worth noting that for 2008, according to the Bergen-Tiedemann
analysis, nearly 60% of the casualties were found to have likely been
civilians.
Overall, the Bergen-Tiedemann analysis—especially when adjusted for its
demonstrable factual errors for drone strikes in 2006—reveals that a
very large number of those killed by U.S. drone strikes are in fact
civilian noncombatants (between 41-46%). Moreover, when one considers
the aforementioned gaps in the Bergen-Tiedemann findings as well as the
ambiguity and obscurity entailed in a considerable number of media
reports regarding the legal status of the victims, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the civilian death toll may indeed be considerably
higher, as suggested by the other analyses cited here. Either way, it is
apparent that civilians are being killed a rate close to that of
suspected low-level militants, if not significantly higher.
In addition, it is important to note that many Pakistanis have since
been killed by drone strikes in the months following the publication of
both the Brookings analysis and the Bergen-Tiedemann casualty report.
Many more have been killed—likely well over two hundred—in the seven
months that have passed since the Mir report was published in /The News/.
Due to both the covert nature of the U.S. attacks as well as the
difficulty of verifying testimonies, events, and reports from Pakistan's
often tumultuous tribal regions, it is virtually impossible to confirm
or establish exact casualty numbers of militants and civilians. Many of
the media reports cited in the Bergen-Tiedemann analysis, for example,
are problematic due to the fact that reported casualty numbers and legal
statuses of the victims are quite often derived solely from the
statements of government officials who, as Bergen and Tiedemann openly
concede, are more than likely to make sweeping claims that only
militants, and no civilians, were killed in any given strike.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn15>[15]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn15> Yet in spite of
these difficulties, observers have every reason to suspect and
reasonably conclude that, as all of the aforementioned reports suggest,
civilians are being killed a rate close to that of suspected low-level
militants, if not at a rate that greatly exceeds the numbers of
suspected militants and leaders killed. Furthermore, it is a matter of
zero controversy that the intended targets—high-level leaders of
al-Qaeda/Taliban—are rarely killed; of the roughly 1,000 people killed
by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, only about twenty were leaders of
militant organizations.
The U.S. government essentially has a policy of not speaking publicly
about the drone attacks in Pakistan, except of course, when on extremely
rare occasions, they hit their "high value" targets. Officials do
routinely claim though, that the attacks are "very precise and [are]
very limited in terms of collateral damage."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn16>[16]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn16> However when asked
for evidence to back up their claims—perhaps just a list of civilian
casualties to prove their assertions—officials always refuse. One of the
leading investigative journalists in the U.S., Gareth Porter, writes
that the government's "refusal to share...even the most basic data on
the bombing attacks...suggests that managers of the drone attacks
programs have been using the total secrecy surrounding the program to
hide abuses and high civilian casualties."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn17>[17]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn17> Indeed, if the
attacks are in fact minimizing civilian casualties, why wouldn't the
government produce evidence to set the record straight? Surely releasing
such information is not a matter of security; the government regularly
brags about the fifteen or so al-Qaeda leaders they have killed. The
truth is, of course, that by all informed and independent accounts, the
drone attacks are killing a very significant number of innocent and
defenseless civilians. Until the government—or anyone else for that
matter—provides evidence to contradict the existing documentary record,
interested parties will have to reject unqualified, unsubstantiated, and
self-serving claims that the U.S. attacks are minimizing civilian killings.
*_International Law _*
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the international community
considerably expanded on the system of international humanitarian law
specifically applicable to states, largely—though not exclusively—with
the purpose of officially criminalizing the wartime actions and
practices of the Nazis. The primary achievement of these efforts has
been the establishment of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which serve as
the bedrock of international humanitarian law. In the decades following
the war, the international community continued to expand on and codify
the laws of war and the basic inalienable rights of all peoples. In 1977
two amendment protocols were added to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
known as Additional Protocol I and II, respectively.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn18>[18]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn18> Just over a decade
prior to these amendments, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and
was enshrined into the system of international law in March of 1976.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn19>[19]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn19>
The Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relates
specifically to the "Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts" and is widely understood to represent customary international
law. It has been a key document—perhaps /the/ key document—in the
International Criminal Tribunal prosecutions of war criminals in regards
to conflicts in Sierra Leone, the Former Yugoslavia, and The Democratic
Republic of Congo.
It should be noted that while the United States is a signatory to the
Additional Protocols of 1977 it has not yet acted to ratify them. With a
handful of exceptions aside, virtually the entire world—168 states—has
ratified the Protocols, including every European state. Despite having
actively been involved in drafting the Protocols along with every other
major world power, the U.S. refused, and presumably continues to refuse
ratification on the basis that, Protocol I in particular, "legitimize[s]
groups involved in wars of national liberation,"
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn20>[20]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn20> a claim that, even
if it were true—the Protocols were designed strictly to protect all
civilian populations—it is not morally clear why that would be
undesirable, especially given the revolutionary history of the
Americans.[21] <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn21>
Furthermore, it is generally accepted—even by the United States—that the
principles and provisions outlined in the Additional Protocols
fundamentally reflect customary international law, applicable to all
states regardless of circumstance.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn22>[22]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn22> The applicability of
customary law has been reaffirmed by the Statute of the International
Court of Justice which states that The Court in its rulings and
deliberations "shall apply [among other sources] international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn23>[23]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn23> Likewise, in an
official declaration and appeal on the 20^th anniversary of the
establishment of the Additional Protocols, the International Committee
of the Red Cross clearly stated that the 1977 amendments largely
"already form a set of rules of customary law valid for every State,
/whether or not it is party to the Protocols/" (emphasis added).
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn24>[24]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn24>This principle of
universal customary international law—specifically as it applies to the
Protocols—was also reaffirmed yet again as recently as ten years ago by
the highest criminal court in the world when the ICC ruled on the
principle of discrimination—a core provision and theme in Protocol I—and
its universal and longstanding applicability "in all armed conflicts."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn25>[25]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn25>
It is also of considerable significance that the Additional Protocols of
the Geneva Conventions have been absolutely vital in their role in
helping to bring war criminals to justice in international prosecutions
that were indeed supported by the United States, most notably in the
case of the Former Yugoslavia.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn26>[26]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn26> Even momentarily
putting aside the universal principle of customary international law,
certainly all would agree that if it is proper to convict /some/ war
criminals on the basis of the provisions in the Protocols, then it is
appropriate that the respective principles should apply to /all/ parties
in /all/ armed conflicts. It is for these reasons that I will argue that
the basic provisions and principles in the Additional Protocols in
actuality do apply to the United States and its drone policy
specifically. Likewise, I will also argue that the major breaches of
international law—those cited and reviewed in this analysis—committed by
the U.S. in its drone attacks indeed constitute violations of universal
customary international humanitarian law in accordance with the opinion
of the International Committee for the Red Cross.[27]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn27>
In the forthcoming case studies of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, I
will focus attention primarily on the following Articles of Additional
Protocol I: Article 17 (Role of the civilian population and of aid
societies), Article 51 (Protection of the civilian population), Article
52 (General Protection of civilian objects), Article 53 (Protection of
cultural objects and places of worship), and Article 57 (Precautions in
attack). <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn28>[28]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn28> These Articles and
the fundamental provisions and principles which they largely—if not
entirely—represent, reflect the well-established and generally
uncontroversial rules of customary international humanitarian law.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn29>[29]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn29> In these instances
for the sake of concision and clarity, I will cite the aforementioned
Articles from Protocol I. It stems from these presumptions then that in
the following case studies it is to be assumed that invocations of the
most basic principles in Protocol I constitute customary international
humanitarian law.
As a matter of clarification, the case studies reviewed here have been
selected not for their uniqueness, but precisely for their relative,
practical equivalence in relation to other U.S. attacks on Pakistani
targets. While it is true that some cases have been specifically chosen
to illustrate certain violations, on the whole the selected cases are,
more or less, typical of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan.
After evaluating the impending case studies in the context of these
Articles, I will briefly introduce Article 6 of Additional Protocol II
and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights with the purpose of establishing a slightly different though
highly relevant framework for evaluating the principle presupposition
underlying the legal rationale for the U.S. attacks.
*_Case Study #1_*
The first case study selected is the September 8, 2008 missile attack on
a North Waziristan village. The drones fired at least five missiles at a
religious school founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani—a Taliban leader (who was
formerly financed by the CIA) and the official target of the U.S.
attack. At least 17 people were killed with some estimates reaching as
high as 23. <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn30>[30]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn30> Of those killed, at
least eight were children. Haqqani's wife, sister, and sister-in-law
were all killed as well. Roughly twenty were wounded, most of which were
women and children according to doctors on the scene. Haqqani was not
present at the time of the bombing.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn31>[31]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn31>
This attack clearly constitutes a violation of Article 51(2) which
states that "the civilian population...shall not be the object of
attack." Even if we accept the claim that the target of the attack was
legitimate, the strike was launched directly at a school—by definition,
probably containing children—which is obviously a civilian center. Under
Article 52(3) the law clearly states that "in case of doubt whether an
object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes such as...a
school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action, it shall be presumed NOT to be so used."
Firing several powerful missiles into one building is definitively
indiscriminate in terms of distinguishing between military and civilian
targets. Article 51(4) clearly prohibits attacks which fail to
discriminate between military and civilian objects and targets. It
states that "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" is prohibited.
It also seems evident that the U.S. planners of the bombings did not
take the necessary precautions required by Article 57 to make certain
that civilians would not be the object of attack. Section 2 of Article
57 states that "those who plan or decide upon an attack" must take "all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of the attack
with a view to avoiding...[or] minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
life...." Planners of the military action must "do everything feasible
to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor
civilian objects...." No evidence was or has since been produced that
would suggest any such precautions were taken in earnest. It should be
further noted that the documentary record of U.S. drone attacks in
Pakistan reveals a disturbing trend of inadequate and insufficient
efforts to comply with this aspect of international law. In the next
case study I will take a closer look at these trends in particular.
*_Case Study #2_*
In one of the earliest drone attacks in Pakistan, the U.S. fired several
missiles—as many as ten—into the village of Damadola, located in the
Bajaur tribal area on January 13, 2006. According to /The Washington
Post/, "the target was a dinner celebrating the Muslim holiday of Eid
al-Adha." The individual whom the U.S. was hoping to kill was Ayman
al-Zawahiri, an al-Qaeda deputy. The CIA had reportedly received some
evidence—possibly derived from an interrogation of another al-Qaeda
operative—that al-Zawahiri was going to be attending the holiday dinner.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn32>[32]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn32> This case study will
deal with two major aspects of apparent legal violations, namely those
of indiscriminate attacks and the failure to take the required
precautions in carrying out the attack.
Initially, U.S. and Pakistani officials declared that up to four members
of al-Qaeda were killed in the bombings. ABC News could hardly contain
its euphoria over the killings and declared the Muslim holiday gathering
to be a "terror summit."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn33>[33]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn33> When the dust
settled after the blasts, at least three houses were totally destroyed
and at least 18 people were killed, with some reports putting the death
toll as high as 22.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn34>[34]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn34> By all accounts,
five children and five women were among the dead while 14 of the dead
were likely from the same family.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn35>[35]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn35> Furthermore, it has
since been confirmed that the "terror summit" was nothing of the sort,
with U.S. and Pakistani officials later admitting that "none of those
al-Qaeda leaders" previously alleged to have "perished in the strike"
were in fact killed, noting that "only local villagers were killed."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn36>[36]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn36>
This attack constitutes a flagrant violation of several Articles of
Protocol I and customary law in general. A home hosting a religious
holiday dinner is not of military character and could not qualify as a
military objective unless it was clear that the home itself was "by
[its] nature, location, purpose, or use [making] an effective
contribution to military action" in accordance with Article 52(2). If it
is true that U.S. planners of the attack struck the home with the intent
of killing Ayman al-Zawahiri, this would also constitute a major breach
of the principle of discrimination. According to Article 51(5) an attack
is considered indiscriminate when "bombardment by any methods or
means...treats as a single military objective a number of clearly
separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town,
village, or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians
and civilian objects." Also indiscriminate is "an attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life...which would be
excessive in relation to the...direct military advantage."
It appears that the U.S. attack, by the first definition of an
indiscriminate attack hardly even rises to the level of
indiscrimination; while militants likely may have been known to frequent
the area, there was no reported distinct military objective in the
immediate area which was attacked. Undoubtedly, CIA operatives were
certainly aware of the fact that bombing a civilian object which might
or might not contain a "high value target" would absolutely be expected
to cause "incidental loss of civilian life," though one could hardly
call such killings "incidental" in light of the predictable and
well-understood consequences of such an undertaking. In a public
statement summarizing its letter of concern to then-President Bush,
Amnesty International arrived at similar conclusions:
"...the fact that air surveillance, witnessed by local people, took
place for several days before the attack indicates that those ordering
the attack on the basis of this information were very likely to have
been aware of the presence of women and children and others unconnected
with political violence in the area of the attack."[37]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn37>
The attack seems to fall unambiguously into the category of Article
51(2) which states that "the civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack" under any
circumstance. Given the apparent level of practical information likely
to have been possessed by the planners of the attack prior to the actual
strike, the bombing appears to constitute a willful and direct attack on
civilians. The next case study will review this particular principle
more closely. For the moment though, I will continue forward on to the
second major aspect of legal accountability in the current case study.
From the reports cited above it appears that the "evidence" possessed by
the CIA regarding the supposed presence of Ayman al-Zawahiri at the
dinner party stemmed from "from the interrogation of another al-Qaeda
leader, Abu Faraj al-Libi, who had been captured eight months earlier."
It is almost certain that al-Libi was tortured into providing such
information, <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn38>[38]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn38> which according to
Pakistani intelligence, turned out to be totally false rather than just
"slightly off." <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn39>[39]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn39> In this context it
appears quite likely that U.S. planners did not even begin to approach
their minimal obligations required by all forms of law to, as it is
stated in Article 57(4) "take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses
of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects." Section 2 makes clear
that planners of the attack must "do everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects." Commanders are required under the same section to "refrain
from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life...." A small bit of information
provided from one man (likely under considerable duress) clearly does
not constitute "doing everything feasible to verify" the information,
and more importantly, to verify that civilians would not be in the line
of fire. If this could not be verified or guaranteed to a reasonable
degree, the strike should not have been permitted. The obvious fact, as
noted above, is that bombing entire houses to ostensibly kill one or
more individuals inside, simply cannot be a lawful discriminatory attack
unless it is absolutely clear that only lawful military targets are
inside and that the physical object of attack is being used for military
objectives.
In all of the casualty reports cited in this paper, the primary
explanation provided for the overwhelming civilian death toll in
comparison with alleged actual targets is the use of poor and unreliable
evidence by the attackers. When reviewing the numerous media reports of
individual drone attacks, the issue of unsubstantiated and sloppy
evidence is a constantly reoccurring theme. Several mainstream press
reports have surfaced over the past several months which suggest that
the CIA is essentially playing Russian roulette with the lives of
Pakistani people living in the tribal areas. In their June analysis of
U.S. drone policy, TIME magazine wrote that "tribesmen have told TIME of
agents who drop microchips near targets; the drones can lock onto these
to guide their missiles or bombs with pinpoint precision."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn40>[40]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn40> /The Guardian/ has
reported similar findings, citing local testimony as well as a Taliban
video capturing a young man confessing to dropping microchips at random
houses in exchange for payment from the CIA.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn41>[41]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn41> While some officials
have written off the confession as "extremist propaganda" journalist
Gareth Porter cites a "knowledgeable" internal Washington source who
says that "the /Guardian/ article is consistent with past CIA
intelligence-gathering methods" in the region. The source told Porter,
"We buy everything. Everything is paid for."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn42>[42]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn42>
/The Guardian/ was also told by "a former CIA officer who served
Waziristan [a tribal area in Pakistan] in 2006" that "the CIA recruits a
network of paid, and sometimes unwitting, informers" mostly comprised of
"poor local men."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn43>[43]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn43> TIME describes
similar findings through its own "reports from Waziristan."
TIME goes on to report that the "thermal cameras" on which drone
operators rely to verify their targets, "are notoriously imperfect. Even
under ideal conditions, images can be blurry." In perhaps the most
chilling revelation, TIME writes that "in one of several stills from
drone video seen by TIME, it's hard to tell if a group of men is
kneeling in prayer or [if] the men are militants in battle formation."
As one top security official told TIME, "the basic problem with all
aerial reconnaissance is that it's subject to error."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn44>[44]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn44>
These findings suggest systematic and egregious violations of Article 57
of Protocol I regarding "Precautions in attack." Taking all feasible
precautions prior to carrying out military actions in order to ensure
the protection of civilians and noncombatants is universally recognized
as a fundamental principle of customary international law as well.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn45>[45]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn45> Regrettably, such
reports also coincide well with the documentary record of the bombings
which reveal functionally methodological patterns of a total lack of
precaution being taken over and over again in the U.S. campaign of drone
strikes. Purchasing data seems inherently unreliable in itself,
especially when those being paid and solicited are some of the most poor
and desperate people in the world. The use of microchips is also
inherently unreliable and insufficient as a means of taking precautions
and verifying targets to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian
objects, as is unequivocally obligatory by all interpretations of
international humanitarian law. Coupled with the reportedly poor
visibility of the drones' thermal cameras, these practices are a virtual
recipe for indiscriminate attacks and attacks on individual civilians
and civilian populations, quite possibly constituting serious war crimes
or crimes against humanity. Based upon available reports and evidence,
as well as the tangible results of numerous U.S. attacks over an
extended period of time it appears quite apparent that even minimal
precautions—let alone "all reasonable precautions" which is required by
law—are not being undertaken by U.S. planners. This suggests a callous
disregard not only for well-established international law, but for
innocent civilian life—including children—in Pakistan on the part of the
United States government. There is no doubt that U.S. officials are
certainly aware of the predictable consequences of their actions and the
risks to civilian life that are being taken by those planning and
carrying out the drone attacks.
*_Case Study #3_*
Case Study #3 will first address the principle of discrimination using a
May 2008 bombing which successfully killed an alleged al-Qaeda target.
Next, using as examples, two additional attacks, (October 2006 & October
2009) as well as the aforementioned May 2008 strike, I will briefly look
at the role the U.S. attacks are playing in disrupting the
then-Pakistani peace process.
On May 14, 2008 two hellfire missiles were fired into the Damadola area
killing 12-15 people—possibly more—and injuring an untold number of
others. The presumed target of the strike, Abu Suleiman al-Jazairi, "a
highly experienced Algerian militant," was killed in the attack.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn46>[46]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn46> The buildings
attacked by the drone included a two-story compound where "militants"
were thought to be having dinner and the home of a local "militant
commander." Pakistani security officials "presume[d] that all those
present there [had] been killed." By all accounts, women and children
were among the dead although the exact number is unknown.
This attack is unlike the previous case studies only in that it actually
succeeded in hitting its target. The same principles apply in terms of
the failure of the U.S. attackers to distinguish between military and
civilian objects and targets. Like the previous case studies, the May
14, 2008 strike (henceforth "the May 2008 strike") represents a clear
violation of sections 4 and 5 of Article 51 which prohibits attacks that
treat military and civilian objects as one in the same. Article 50(3)
states that "the presence within the civilian population of individuals
who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the
population of its civilian character." The May 2008 strike has since
proven to have killed perhaps over a dozen people—including women and
children who under the law enjoy the highest protections against
attack—in the process of assassinating one man.
In 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
rejected the defendant, Stanislav Galic's claims that the presence of
military targets within a civilian center essentially justifies an
indiscriminate attack. The Court ruled authoritatively that it is
unlawful to "target" military objectives within a civilian area when the
attacker could reasonably "expect excessive civilian causalities to
result from the attack." Citing a specific example, The Court ruled that
"Although the number of soldiers present at the game was significant, an
attack on a crowd of approximately 200 people, including numerous
children would clearly be expected to cause incidental loss of life and
injuries to civilians excessive in relation to the direct and concrete
military advantage anticipated."
Likewise, it could easily be said for the May 2008 strike, as well as
many other U.S. drone strikes, that
"Although the number of militants present in the [immediate] area was
significant, an attack on buildings with at least fifteen people,
including numerous women and children inside would clearly be expected
to cause incidental loss of life and injuries to civilians excessive in
relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated."
According to the same ruling, a strike can only be carried out if the
"military character of a target has been ascertained." It is not clear
that U.S. planners were able to ascertain that the target of the May
2008 strike was of military character. Although it is unlikely, assuming
that planners did in fact (incorrectly) ascertain the military character
of the target, the strike is prohibited from being carried out if it is
"expected to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians" and so
forth. Also applicable to the earlier case studies, the International
Criminal Court officially has taken the position civilian deaths of this
kind can hardly be considered "incidental." The ruling of the Trial
Chamber deserves full quotation:
"...indiscriminate attacks, that is to say, attacks which strike
civilians or civilian objects and military objectives without
distinction, /may qualify as direct attacks against civilians/. It notes
that indiscriminate attacks are expressly prohibited by Additional
Protocol I. This prohibition reflects a well-established rule of
customary law/ applicable in all armed conflicts /(emphasis added)."
Thus, according to the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions,
well-established customary international law, and the ruling of the
highest court in the world, indiscriminate attacks—the defining
characteristic of U.S. drone strikes—which kill or injure civilians are
not to be considered "accidental" or "unintentional" but rather "direct
attacks against civilians." Under the law, such attacks fall into the
same category as a suicide bombing in the sense that it is by
definition, nondiscriminatory and thereby considered to be plainly an
attack on civilians. This reflects the principle of proportionality as
it applies to discrimination.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn47>[47]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn47>
The second aspect of the May 2008 strike that needs to be
addressed is the timing of the attack. According to a report issued in
the prominent Pakistani newspaper, DAWN, which consistently provides
reliable coverage from the tribal areas, "significantly, the missile
strike came while a prisoner exchange was taking place between the
government and militant commander, Baitullah Mehsud in South
Waziristan." The article goes on to quote a "militant spokesman, Maulvi
Muhammad Omar" who observed that "the missile strike was an attempt by
the United States to derail the peace process between militants and the
government." <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn48>[48]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn48> In itself, the
timing may or may not have been incidental and the assertion that the
U.S. was attempting to "derail" potential peace agreements could be
equally subject to suspicion. However, the specific timing of such an
attack turned out not to be an isolated incident. In at least two other
known cases U.S. drones attacked tribal area people and infrastructure
in what appears to have been an attempt to sabotage ceasefire/neutrality
agreements with area militants and the government of Pakistan.
In late October of 2006 the U.S. attacked a religious seminary in the
same area of Bajaur province in Damadola on precisely "the day the
government was expected to sign a peace agreement with militants in
Bajaur replicating the September 5 truce reached with militants in North
Waziristan." The attack predictably destroyed the possibility of the
truce. DAWN reported that had the peace agreement been signed, it "would
have resulted in the grant of a pardon to the two most wanted militants,
Maulana Faqir Mohammad and Maulvi Liaqat. Both had been charged with
harboring and providing shelter to Al Qaeda operatives."
Lending more credibility to the notion that the U.S. attacks were aimed
at squashing a potential truce between the Pakistani government and the
tribal area militants is the fact that there was no ostensible,
declared, or even suspected "high value target" present at the scene of
the October bombing. In fact, the strike was arguably the most blatant
attack—and the most deadly—on a civilian population that the U.S. has
carried out in Pakistan thus far. It has been confirmed that 82 people
were killed in the strike on the religious school. While most of the
victims were young male students in their early twenties "12 of them
were said to be children in their early teens."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn49>[49]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn49> The fact that there
was zero conceivable military advantage to the attack is further
evidence that the strike may have been carried out for purely political
reasons.
In another similar, more recent example, on October 21, 2009, a U.S
missile strike in South Waziristan killed twelve people, likely
including several children while maiming at least two girls, aged four
and six. <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn50>[50]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn50> The strike was
politically significant because, according to AP reports, "it hit
territory controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a militant leader the
[Pakistani] army has coaxed into remaining neutral during the [army's]
offensive against the Mehsud faction in South Waziristan."Pakistan's
military incursion into South Waziristan has been widely recognized as a
policy derived from heavy and escalating U.S. pressure to confront
tribal area militant strongholds in service of U.S. interests in
occupied Afghanistan.The AP article goes on to report that the
government of Pakistan "considers Bahadur, along with militant leader
Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan, lesser priorities because they focus
on battling U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, not targets inside
Pakistan." <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn51>[51]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn51> Combined with the
aforementioned examples, this fact lends serious credibility to the
notion that the U.S. government indeed had a very strategic interest in
using violence to destroy any neutrality agreements between Bahadur
controlled militants and the Pakistani government. Furthermore it is not
clear that any significant militant leader was being specifically
targeted in the strike. A suspected al-Qaeda explosives expert, Abu Musa
al Masri, was initially reported to have been killed in the attack, but
U.S. intelligence officials have been admittedly unable to confirm this
claim. It is worth noting that al Masri has been falsely reported dead
on at least two prior occasions as well.[52]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn52>
Lastly, when considering the regional events which have unfolded in the
months and years that have passed since the May 2008 strike and the
October attacks of 2006 and 2009, it is not unrealistic or irrational to
suspect that the U.S. indeed was pursuing a very real interest in
blocking any sort of settlement between tribal militants and the
Pakistani government. While it is not the purpose of this analysis to
explore the entire geopolitical context of US-Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations, it is certainly beyond reasonable debate that in the past
several months—indeed since the Obama administration took office—the
U.S. has strongly pushed and pressured the government of Pakistan to
wage massive counterinsurgency campaigns against suspected militant
strongholds in areas under Pakistani authority and sovereignty, as was
seen, for example, in the Pakistani Army's ruthless operation in the
SWAT Valley in April and May of 2009, as well as the army's incursion
into South Waziristan which was launched in mid-October of 2009.
The purpose of raising questions in these cases regarding the purpose of
individual U.S. attacks is to determine the legal implications of the
nature of the strikes. If indeed the United States attacked on one or
more occasions targets in Pakistan with the purpose of inflaming
tensions between militants and the government in order to sabotage
attempts at establishing a truce or ceasefire, the U.S. is potentially
guilty of severe violations of the most fundamental rules of
international law in making "the civilian population...the object of
attacks," in the pursuit of a political goal (Section 2 of Article 51).
Nonetheless, regardless of the political purpose of the attacks reviewed
in this particular case study, it appears that serious violations of
international law were likely committed by the U.S. in terms of
discrimination and proportionality, possibly amounting to serious war
crimes.
*_Case Study #4_*
Case Study #4 contains accounts of two separate drone attacks. They have
been grouped together in the interest of concision, and on the basis
that the two incidents are characteristically similar and represent
uniquely worrying developments in U.S. drone policy.
On Tuesday, May 19, 2009 three travelers passed through the village of
Khaisor in North Waziristan. In keeping with traditional tribal area
hospitality, local villagers served them a meal. Upon finishing their
food, the travelers promptly moved on and left the village. These
travelers happened to be members of the Taliban. U.S. drones, which
routinely conduct surveillance flights of the area, apparently made note
of the presence of the three Taliban men. At 4:30 a.m. the following
morning (May 20^th ) a drone bombed the homes of the villagers who fed
the men, ultimately "killing 14 women and children and two elders, [and]
wounding 11." <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn53>[53]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn53>
It is almost certain that drone operatives were aware that the three
militants had indeed left the area long before the strike was launched.
If the drone operatives were keeping such close surveillance on the area
as to notice the otherwise insignificant occurrence of three traveling
men passing through the village, it is likely that they took note of the
militants' quick departure as well. The fact that the U.S. attacked the
village the following day, well after the travelers had left, suggests
that the bombing was intended to punish the villagers for feeding the
'enemy' by bombing their homes, in a clear attack on civilian
noncombatants including several children. The attack was further likely
meant to intimidate locals into not providing any hospitality or aid to
suspected militants in the future.
There is no doubt that the Khaisor strike constitutes a flagrant
violation of Article 51(2) which plainly rejects any notion that
civilians may under any circumstance be the object of attack. More
specific to this case, Article 51(6) explicitly forbids the use of
violence against civilians as a means of revenge or intimidation:
"Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of
reprisals are prohibited." Article 52(1) goes on to say that "civilian
objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals."
Just less than one month later (June 18^th ) in Raghzai, South
Waziristan, a U.S. drone fired two missiles into a compound, killing one
person. Immediately, locals rushed to the scene to rescue wounded
survivors. The drone, still hovering over the area, seized the
opportunity and fired an additional two missiles at the villagers who
were attempting to attend to the wounded, killing 12 more people, 13 in
all. <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn54>[54]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn54> It was suspected
that "Taliban commander," Wali Mohammed, may have been the initial
target of the attack. Mohammed was reportedly not in the compound.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn55>[55]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn55>
This attack is significant for its deliberate targeting of local people
who hurried to the site of the attack in an attempt to provide aid and
assistance to those who were wounded in the initial strike. It again
appears that drone operatives may have bombed and killed hospitable
local villagers in an attempt to both punish and intimidate the general
civilian population for its own purposes. Not only are attacks which are
leveled against civilian noncombatants expressly prohibited under all
circumstances, but moreover, international law—by both treaty and
custom—specifically prohibits attacks on noncombatants seeking to
provide aid to the wounded. Article 17(1) states that "the civilian
population and aid societies...shall be permitted, even on their own
initiative, to collect and care for the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked,
even in invaded or occupied territories. No one shall be harmed
prosecuted, convicted, or punished for such humanitarian acts." It is
reasonable to conclude, based on the available evidence that both the
attacks of May 20^th and June 18^th likely constitute considerable
breaches of fundamental principles and provisions of all standards of
international law which are applicable in all armed conflicts.
*_Case Study #5_*
On Tuesday, June 23, 2009, hundreds of Pakistanis attended a funeral in
the Makeen district of South Waziristan for a suspected Taliban leader
who was killed in a drone strike earlier that morning. Towards the end
of the funeral as people were giving their last prayers, three missiles
were fired from at least two U.S. drones directly into the crowd of
mourners. Various reports put the death toll at roughly 70-80 people.
Conservative estimates suggest that at least 35 of the dead were local
villagers, among them ten children between the ages of 5-10 years old
and four local tribal elders. Doctors told journalists and reporters
that "most of the injured brought to them were [elderly] people."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn56>[56]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn56> According to one
report at least 45 civilians were killed.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn57>[57]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn57> Another account
suggested that "mostly civilians were killed in the strikes."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn58>[58]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn58> Every report agrees
on the fact that no prominent or significant militant leader was harmed
in the attack.
By all standards, the missile strikes on the funeral constitute, at
best, both a disproportionate attack and a categorical failure to
discriminate between military and civilian objects and targets, which as
noted in Case Study #3, legally qualifies as a direct attack on
civilians. Worse yet, it seems beyond controversy that the U.S. attack
violates Article 53(a) which prohibits all parties from committing "any
acts of hostility directed against [among other things]...places of
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples."
Article 53(c) also prohibits "[making] such objects the object of
reprisals."
These prohibitions on attacking places of worship render any claims of
the June 24^th funeral strike being a legitimate attack null and void,
regardless who might have been in attendance. No reasonable standard of
what constitutes a military objective or military character could
possibly be applied to an unsuspecting crowd of mourners and worshippers
praying at a funeral.
*_Extrajudicial Executions_*
Up until now, for the sake of evaluating the substance and
results of the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan, I have been tacitly
assuming that the drone strikes are legitimate under international law
as long U.S. operatives take proper precautions and distinguish between
civilian and military objects. Virtually all mainstream commentary in
the United States—critical or otherwise—on U.S. drone policy functions
with the fundamental presupposition that the U.S. government has the
right to target and kill suspected leaders of militant organizations at
its own discretion.
In an official public statement on January 31, 2006, Amnesty
International summarized and expanded upon a letter it wrote to
then-President George W. Bush regarding recent drone strikes in Bajaur
[Tribal] Agency. In the letter, Amnesty expressed its concern that "a
pattern of killings carried out with [the drones] appeared to reflect a
U.S. government policy condoning extrajudicial executions." The letter
reiterated to the President that "extrajudicial executions are strictly
prohibited under international human rights law. Anyone accused of an
offence, however serious, has the right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty and to have their guilt or innocence established in a
regular court of law in a fair trial."
While making note of the close security and intelligence
relationship shared by the U.S. and Pakistan, Amnesty International
observed the fact "that the USA believed they knew the location of
suspects, [which] suggest[s] that it may have been possible to attempt
to arrest the suspects in order to bring them to trial" rather than
simply making assassination attempts. "The failure to attempt such
arrest," AI continued, "points to a policy of elimination of suspects
and a deliberate disregard of the duty to prosecute in a fair process."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn59>[59]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn59> Although Amnesty was
making reference to one particular attack, the same principles clearly
could apply to all U.S. attempts at targeted killings of "high value
targets" in Pakistan.
In addition to international human rights law, extrajudicial
assassinations are prohibited in accordance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States has
ratified. Article 6(1) states that "Every human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. /No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life/" (emphasis added). The subsequent
Section of Article 6 further stipulates that the "penalty [of death] can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a
competent court."[60] <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn60>
Also reflecting clear standards of international law is
Article 6(2) of Additional Protocol II. The following provisions reflect
principles similar to those outlined in the ICCPR and are specifically
applicable if the U.S. in its drone strikes in Pakistani territory is
perceived to be working in concert with the government of Pakistan.
Section 2(d) reaffirms that "anyone charged with an offence is presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law." Section 2(e) of Article
6 stipulates that "anyone charged with an offence shall have the right
to be tried in his presence."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn61>[61]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn61>
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial
Executions, Philip Alston, has also criticized the drone strikes on the
basis that "drones/Predators are being operated in a framework which may
well violate international humanitarian law and international human
rights law." Alston, who is also a professor of law at New York
University and co-chair of the law school's Center for Human Rights and
Global Justice, has repeatedly called on U.S. administrations to
disclose both the details of the drone program and the subsequent legal
basis under which the program is being operated. So long as the U.S.
government refuses to openly discuss its drone assassination policy,
Alston says, "you have the really problematic bottom line that the CIA
is running a program that is killing significant numbers of people and
there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the relevant
international laws."[62] <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn62>
In the past, several U.S. administrations have attempted to
legally justify their authority to arbitrarily assassinate people on the
grounds that longstanding executive orders banning extrajudicial
executions do not apply to anyone declared to be an "enemy commander."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn63>[63]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn63> This interpretation
has no legal significance or acceptance among independent human rights
groups, the International Court of Justice, the ICRC, the United Nations
Council for Human Rights, or any other legitimate authority on
international law. In fact, such an interpretation is virtually
indistinguishable from the Bush administration's claim that those whom
the U.S. declare to be "enemy combatants" are not entitled to human
rights protections and Prisoner of War status guaranteed to them under
the Fourth Geneva Convention. Of course, these legal distortions have
since been widely discredited, even rejected as illegitimate by David
Petraeus, the Commanding General of the "Multi-National Force" in Iraq
under former President Bush.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn64>[64]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn64> The prohibition on
extrajudicial executions is a core principle of both treaty law and
customary law. U.S. drone attacks in this sense differ from the
obviously illegal act of shooting a suspect on his knees in the back of
the head with handgun /only/ in that U.S. attacks often kill defenseless
civilians at high rates, who often have no meaningful relation to any
military conflict.
*_Technical Classifications_*
In this analysis of U.S. drone policy towards Pakistan I have
reviewed the most prominent and mainstream casualty reports, numerous
independent accounts compiled by journalists and human rights workers,
and have generally drawn from an extremely diverse, credible, and
international collection of media reports chronicling the details of
several drone attacks over a period of 45 months. Using a broad range of
international legal conventions, protocols, covenants, customs, and high
court rulings, I have sought in earnest to determine the legal status of
U.S. actions and policy. Based upon these uncontroversial and universal
standards of law it appears beyond any reasonable legal objection that
the United States in its nearly four year policy of bombing Pakistan
with unmanned aerial vehicles is guilty of a very large amount of war
crimes, including failure to take proper precautions in the interest of
protecting civilian life, failing to discriminate between military and
civilian objects, disproportionate attacks, extrajudicial executions,
committing acts of hostility and violence against places of worship,
direct attacks on the civilian population and individual civilians,
willful attacks on civilians seeking to provide assistance to the
wounded, and making civilian objects the object of attack and reprisal.
Furthermore, using the official legal standards of the United
States government as articulated in the U.S. code—legislation which has
passed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate—it appears
that the drone strikes would be technically classified as "international
terrorism" which refers to "activities [transcending national
boundaries] that— involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State...or that appear to be
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction [or] assassination...."[65]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn65>

Recalling the judgment of the International Criminal Court which ruled
that indiscriminate attacks qualify as direct attacks against civilians
and recognizing the nature of the strikes reviewed in Case Studies 3-5
in particular, it is the opinion of this analysis that the actions of
the U.S. government in respect to its bombing campaign in Pakistan
appear to have been often intended to intimidate or coerce civilian
populations and to influence the conduct of the Pakistani government
through violence. It is also certain that indiscriminate attacks, direct
attacks on civilians, and extrajudicial assassinations would be clear
violations of the criminal laws of the United States or of any other State.

*_Final Remarks_*
This report has generally avoided the potential issues of
aggression and violation of sovereignty due to the widespread belief,
both in the United States and Pakistan, that the Pakistani government
while publicly opposing most drone attacks has indeed privately given
the U.S. the green light to carry out such attacks. However, even if the
allegations are true, it is unclear if the consent of the government of
Pakistan has any substantial effect on the U.S. policy. Also, it is
notable that according to public opinion polls, the overwhelming
majority of Pakistanis, 76%, are opposed to the U.S. strikes, with 80%
entirely opposed to U.S. involvement in Pakistan's internal struggle
against terrorism.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn66>[66]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_edn66> The argument could
certainly be made that the U.S. strikes do in fact constitute a
violation of the Charter of the United Nations under Article 2(4) as
well as a violation of the principles of the Nuremburg Tribunal which
not only prohibits the crime of aggression but declares it to be "the
supreme international crime."
Nevertheless, the documentary evidence of the nature,
practice, and results of U.S. bombings juxtaposed with well-established
principles of international law suggests the near-certainty of the
commission of many war crimes over a sustained period of time on the
part of the United States government. In light of these implications, it
is the opinion of this analysis that the U.S. government should declare
an immediate and unconditional moratorium on drone strikes and "targeted
killings" of any kind, in Pakistan or elsewhere. It is also the opinion
of this analysis that an independent fact-finding commission should be
appointed by the United Nations to gather data and testimonies in order
to investigate these allegations further. In the United States,
representative government bodies should immediately take measures to
declassify CIA and State Department documents regarding existing legal
memos on the use of targeted killings and all other relevant information
concerning the human costs of the drone policy. Congress might also
subpoena officials from both the Bush and Obama administrations and the
Central Intelligence Agency to testify under oath to this end. If indeed
it is determined by either Congress or the UN fact finding commission
that abuses and violations have likely taken place, those responsible
should be charged and tried in the International Criminal Court, in
accordance with reasonably analogous precedents and the basic guidelines
of international law.
*/Max Kantar /*/is an independent writer and Michigan based human rights
activist. He frequently writes on U.S. foreign policy, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, social justice, and mainstream American
media coverage. He can be contacted at/ maxkantar@gmail.com
<mailto:maxkantar@gmail.com>.

----------------------------------------------------------
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref1>[1]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref1> Drones are
unmanned aerial vehicles (military aircraft without people inside them)
which are operated by computer remote control. The drones are capable of
carrying several Hellfire missiles and multiple 500-pound laser-guided
bombs. Drones are also used extensively for surveillance purposes. In
the case of US strikes in Pakistan, the drones are guided and monitored
from Creech Air Force base in the state of Nevada. It is not matter of
certainty where the actual drones are launched from. Although it was
previously assumed that the drones were being launched from military
bases in Afghanistan, Senator Diane Feinstein told a U.S. Senate hearing
in February that the drones were being flown from an air base inside
Pakistan.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref2>
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref2>[2]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref2> Amir Mir, "60
drone hits kill 14 al-Qaeda men, 687 civilians," /The News/, April 10,
2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=21440.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref3>
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref3>[3]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref3> Peter Bergen and
Katherine Tiedemann, "The Drone War," /The New Republic/, June 3, 2009,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref4>
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref4>[4]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref4> David Kilcullen
and Andrew Exum, "Death From Above, Outrage Down Below," /New York
Times/, May 17, 2009.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref5>
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref5>[5]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref5> It should be noted
though that the authors did express reservations about the certainty or
lack thereof regarding the casualty numbers provided in the April report
published in /The News/. However, given Kilcullen's repeated endorsement
of the April report, readers might reasonably attribute this mild
reservation to Exum.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref6>
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref6>[6]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref6> Daniel L. Byman,
"Do Targeted Killings Work?," /Brookings/, July 14, 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0714_targeted_killings_byman.aspx.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref7>
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref7>[7]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref7> "About Brookings,"
/Brookings/, http://www.brookings.edu/about/reputation.aspx. See the
reports linked for /Think Tank Index/ and /Fairness and Accuracy in
Reporting/.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref8>
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref8>[8]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref8> Peter Bergen &
Katherine Tiedemann, "Revenge of the Drones: An Analysis of Drone
Strikes in Pakistan," /The New America Foundation/, October 19, 2009,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge_drones.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref9>[9]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref9> The media
organizations consistently and exclusively cited by Bergen and Tiedemann
include (in their own words) "reports in the /New York Times, Washington
Post,/
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref10>[10]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref10> /CNN/, "Official:
Al Qaeda weaons expert likely killed in U.S. airstrike," July 29, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/29/pakistan.strike/index.html.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref11>[11]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref11> Ibid.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref12>[12]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref12> Craig Whitlock,
"The New Al-Qaeda Central," /The Washington Post/, September 9, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801845.html.

<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref13>[13]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref13> Anwarullah Khan,
"82 die as missiles rain on Bajaur: Pakistan owns up to strike; locals
blame US drones," /DAWN/, October 31, 2006,
http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/31/top1.htm. Note: In regards to the title
which suggests that the Pakistani government may have been responsible
for carrying out the strike, this claim has since been categorically
abandoned by the Pakistani government. It is now a matter of zero
controversy that US drones were indeed responsible for the attack, just
as the locals had been saying all along. Bergen and Tiedemann also are
apparently unaware of this development as they noted reservations about
the identity of the attacker. For clarification: Christina Lamb, "US
carried out madrasah bombing," /The Sunday Times/, November 26, 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article650044.ece.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref14>[14]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref14> 'Unconfirmed' or
'unidentified' in this instance refers to the legal status (rather than
the name) of those killed in drone attacks.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref15>[15]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref15> Bergen &
Tiedemann, "Revenge of the Drones." See appendix 2. It is worth
mentioning that for 2009, and generally speaking, a considerable
majority of the media reports cited relies heavily, if not exclusively,
on statements from government sources. Such information should be
reviewed with general skepticism for the reason that, as virtually every
independent observer has acknowledged, civilian casualties are
inevitable in drone strikes due to, among other factors, the poorly
constructed tribal infrastructure, systematically unreliable
intelligence, the civilian nature of the areas surrounding suspected
compounds, and the civilian nature of many of the objects attacked by
drones (such as homes).
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref16>[16]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref16> /CNN,/ "U.S.
airstrikes in Pakistan called 'very effective,'" May 18, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref17>[17]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref17> Gareth Porter,
"US-Pakistan: CIA Secrecy on Drone Attacks Data Hides Abuses," /Inter
Press Service News Agency/, June 12, 2009,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47196.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref18>[18]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref18> International
Humanitarian Law - Treaties and Documents, "Geneva Conventions of 1949 &
Additional Protocols," /International Committee of the Red Cross/,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView. Any reference made to the
Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols henceforth can be cross
checked or reviewed here where the full text of all four conventions and
all three protocols can be accessed.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref19>[19]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref19> Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,"
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. Any reference made to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights henceforth can be
cross checked or reviewed here where the full text of the Covenant can
be accessed.

<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref20>[20]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref20> "Geneva
Conventions," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2009
http://encarta.msn.com © 1997-2009 Microsoft Corporation.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref21>[21]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref21> It is widely
understood that the fear of "legitimizing national liberation movements"
had much to do with Palestinian nationalism (the PLO) and resistance to
US-backed Israeli occupation. It is also likely that this object stemmed
largely in part from longtime US fears of what postwar planners called
"radical third world nationalism," meaning quite literally, popular
movements in poor countries aimed at improving the living standards of
the poor majority at the expense of catering to foreign investors.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref22>[22]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref22> "Geneva
Conventions," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref23>[23]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref23> "Statute of the
Court," International Court of Justice,
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0
<http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0>.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref24>[24]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref24> Cornelio
Sommaruga, "Appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross on
the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Additional Protocols of
1977," /International Review of the Red Cross/,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNUX.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref25>[25]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref25> "The Prosecutor
v. Stanislav Galic: Judgment and Opinion," /Netherlands Institute of
Human Rights/, December 12, 2003
(http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/tribunalen.nsf/6c3f0d5286f9bf3cc12571b500329d62/31f622000d199e48c12571fe004be26e?OpenDocument). See
the second heading, "Attack on Civilians as a Violation of the Laws or
Customs of War" and correspondingly, section 57.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref26>[26]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref26> Ibid.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref27>[27]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref27> International
Committee of the Red Cross, "List of customary rules of international
humanitarian law," March 31, 2005,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/customary-law-rules-291008.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref28>[28]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref28> To be clear,
until otherwise stated, all following references to "Articles" of
international law in respect to the case studies should be assumed to be
derived from Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref29>[29]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref29> International
Committee of the Red Cross, "List of customary rules of international
humanitarian law."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref30>[30]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref30> Jane Perlez and
Pir Zubair Shah, "U.S. attack on Taliban kills 23 in Pakistan," /New
York Times/, September 9, 2008.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref31>[31]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref31> "Civilian deaths
in Pakistan attack," /Al Jazeera English/, September 8, 2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/09/2008985226998512.html.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref32>[32]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref32> Whitlock, "The
New Al-Qaeda Central."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref33>[33]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref33> *Habibullah Khan
and Brian Ross, "U.S. Strike Killed Al-Qaeda Bomb Maker," /ABC News/,
January 18, 2006,
*http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1517986*. *
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref34>[34]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref34> Christina Lamb,
"Airstrike misses Al-Qaeda Chief," /The Sunday Times/, January 15, 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article788673.ece.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref35>[35]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref35> Imtiaz Ali in
Damadola and Massoud Ansari, "Pakistan fury as CIA airstrike on village
kills 18," /The Daily Telegraph/, January 15, 2006,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/1507895/Pakistan-fury-as-CIA-airstrike-on-village-kills-18.html.

<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref36>[36]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref36> Whitlock, "The
New Al-Qaeda Central."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref37>[37]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref37> Amnesty
International, "Pakistan: US involvement in civilian deaths," January
31, 2006,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGASA330022006
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGASA330022006>.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref38>[38]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref38> It has been well
documented by /Human Rights Watch/ as well as others that Pakistani
security forces routinely torture prisoners and detainees. It is simply
rational to assume that a fairly high-level al-Qaeda operative like
al-Libi was also tortured into providing, what turned out to be, false
information.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref39>[39]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref39> Whitlock, "The
New Al-Qaeda Central."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref40>[40]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref40> Bobby Ghosh and
Mark Thompson, "The CIA's Silent War in Pakistan," /TIME/, June 1, 2009.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref41>[41]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref41> Declan Walsh,
"Mysterious 'chip' is CIA's latest weapon against al-Qaida targets
hiding in Pakistan's tribal belt," /The Guardian/, May 31, 2009.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref42>[42]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref42> Porter,
"US-Pakistan: CIA Secrecy on Drone Attacks Data Hides Abuses."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref43>[43]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref43> Walsh,
"Mysterious 'chip' is CIA's latest weapon...."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref44>[44]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref44> Ghosh and
Thompson, "The CIA's Secret War...."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref45>[45]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref45> ICRC, "List of
customary rules of international humanitarian law."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref46>[46]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref46> Jason Burke,
"Al-Qaeda chief dies in missile air strike," /The Guardian/, June 1, 2008.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref47>[47]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref47> "The Prosecutor
v. Stanislav Galic: Judgment and Opinion," /Netherlands Institute of
Human Rights/. Again, see the second heading, "Attack on Civilians as a
Violation of the Laws or Customs of War" and correspondingly, section 57.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref48>[48]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref48> Anwarullah Khan,
"12 killed in drone attack on Damadola," /DAWN/, May 15, 2008,
http://www.dawn.com/2008/05/15/top5.htm.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref49>[49]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref49> Khan, "82 die as
missiles rain on Bajaur: Pakistan owns up to strike; locals blame US
drones."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref50>[50]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref50> Hussain Afzal and
Nahal Toosi, "Missile strike could complicate Pakistan battle,"
/Associated Press/, October 21, 2009,
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/10/21/missile-strike-could-complicate-pakistan-battle/
(accessed November 15, 2009).
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref51>[51]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref51> Ibid.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref52>[52]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref52> Bill Roggio, "Al
Qaeda commander reported killed in US airstrike," /The Long War
Journal/, October 21, 2009,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/al_qaeda_commander_r_1.php
(accessed November 15, 2009).
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref53>[53]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref53> Kathy Kelly,
"Visitors and Hosts in Pakistan," /The Huffington Post/, June 9, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kathy-kelly/visitors-and-hosts-in-pak_b_213472.html.

<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref54>[54]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref54> Kathy Kelly, "Now
We See You, Now We Don't," /The Huffington Post/, June 25, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kathy-kelly/now-we-see-you-now-we-don_b_220578.html.

<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref55>[55]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref55> Pir Zubair Shah,
"Pakistan Says U.S. Drone Kills 13," /New York Times/, June 19, 2009.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref56>[56]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref56> Mushtaq Yusufzai,
Irfan Burki and Malik Mumtaz, "No prominent militant killed in drone
attack," /The News/, June 25, 2009,
http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=22926.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref57>[57]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref57> "'US Drone' hits
Pakistan funeral," /Al Jazeera English/, June 24, 2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/06/20096244230395712.html.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref58>[58]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref58> "Missile attacks
kill 50 in South Waziristan," /DAWN/, June 24, 2009,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-suspected-us-drone-strikes-swaziristan-qs-03.

<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref59>[59]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref59> Amnesty
International, "Pakistan: US involvement in civilian deaths."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref60>[60]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref60> Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." See note 19 for link.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref61>[61]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref61> International
Humanitarian Law - Treaties and Documents, "Geneva Conventions of 1949 &
Additional Protocols," /International Committee of the Red Cross/. See
note 13 for link.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref62>[62]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref62> /Agence
France-Presse/, "US Drone Strikes May Break International Law: UN,"
CommonDreams.org, October 28, 2009,
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/10/28 (accessed November 15,
2009).
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref63>[63]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref63> Bergen and
Tiedemann, "The Drone War."
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref64>[64]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref64> Scott Horton,
"Petraeus: Bush Administration Violated Geneva Conventions," /Harper's
Magazine/, June 1, 2009,
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/06/hbc-90005079.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref65>[65]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref65> /Find Law/,
"Cases and Codes: US Code," http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/.
Search Title 18, Section 2331.
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref66>[66]
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/23346#_ednref66> Jane Perlez,
"Pakistanis Continue to Reject U.S. Partnership," /New York Times/,
September 30, 2009.

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11.: Russia's new military doctrine: more threats, smaller risks / Ru

Posted by: "linguisticresearch" LinguisticResearch@gmx.de

Wed Dec 23, 2009 8:29 pm (PST)

http://rt.com/prime-time/2009-12-17/russia-new-military-doctrine.html?fullstory

Russia's new military doctrine: more threats, smaller risks

Published 17 December, 2009, 15:35

Edited 18 December, 2009, 11:36

Russian military will have more options to use nuclear arms and see more
potential threats to the country's security when the new military
doctrine comes into force.

The document, which is expected to be put in place before the year's
end, will replace the version adopted in 2000. The draft document has
been revealed to the media this week, reports Gazeta newspaper.

Read more
<http://rt.com/prime-time/2009-12-17/russia-new-military-doctrine.html?fullstory>

Earlier, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolay
Patrushev, announced
<http://rt.com/Top_News/2009-10-14/russia-broaden-nuclear-strike.html>
that Moscow will consider the nuclear weapons as a possible option in
more situations than it used to. A pre-emptive nuclear strike with
nuclear weapons will be a possible scenario, for example.

The number of military threats listed in the document has also been
enlarged, according to the 17-page draft document. Those will include
other nation's ignoring of Russia's strategic security interests,
attempts to tip the balance of power in the neighborhood of Russia and
her allies, and moves to change the balance in "nuclear and missile
sphere", like deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system.

Also on the threats list is interference with Russia's internal
policies, territorial disputes, arms race and undermining of
international measures on arms limitation and reduction, possible
deployment of weapons in space, and military conflicts near Russian borders.

At the same time, the doctrine is to state that risk of a large-scale
armed conflict involving Russia has decreased over the past decades.

Mikhail Troitsky from the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations says he wouldn't describe the new doctrine as aggressive.

/"Elaborating strategies of using nuclear weapons is very much a
political process. It actually intended to send political signals to
both Russia's counterparts and potential foes," /he said.

--------------------------

http://rt.com/Top_News/2009-10-14/russia-broaden-nuclear-strike.html

Russia to broaden nuclear strike options

Published 14 October, 2009, 22:58

Edited 17 October, 2009, 06:59

Russia's new military doctrine will put more emphasis on nuclear
capabilities. Moscow will be able to use nukes in small-scale conflicts
and launch pre-emptive nuclear strikes.

The news comes from Nikolay Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian
Security Council. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia,
he said that the new document, which is now prepared to be signed into
law, will have several revisions from the current version adopted in 2000.

/"The current doctrine is a transitional document for the end of the
20th century," /he said. "/Analysis of the strategic military situation
in the world and the trends we'll see until 2020 suggests a shift from
large-scale conflicts to local wars and armed conflicts."/

Read more
<http://rt.com/Top_News/2009-10-14/russia-broaden-nuclear-strike.html?fullstory>

Patrushev announced that Russia will see nuclear weapons as a legitimate
means of war in small-scale conflicts.

/"We have corrected the conditions for use of nuclear weapons to resist
aggression with conventional forces not only in large-scale wars, but
also in regional or even a local one,"/ he said.

/"There is also a multiple-options provision for use of nuclear weapons
depending on the situation and intentions of the potential enemy," /he
added./ "In a situation critical for national security, we don't exclude
a preventive nuclear strike at the aggressor."/

Russia's NATO envoy, Dmitry Rogozin, said that the new doctrine is based
on an analysis of future threats to Russia

/"The threat of a large-scale intercontinental war is no longer

present," /he said. /"Russia's main threat is now coming from
territorial and local conflict. So the country is developing a compact,
mobile force with state-of-the-art flexible nuclear weaponry. This is
similar to the path the French took under Charles de Gaulle."/

The announcement of the doctrine came during US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton's visit to Moscow, with nuclear non-proliferation being
one of the top issues on the agenda. Clinton claims that US military
doctrine does not allow the preventive use of nukes. But analysts say
that over the past decade, the US has demonstrated the exact opposite.

/"The United States was ready to use nuclear weapons against Iraq in
2003, and then against Iran in 2008," /said Konstantin Sivkov, the vice
president of Geopolitical Science Academy/. "This was clearly
demonstrated through statements of high-profile military and political
officials.// So, saying the U.S doctrine does not directly include the
use of preventive nuclear strikes is not correct."/

Russia's revised military doctrine will be submitted to the president by
the end of this year. If adopted, it will be a strong change from the
military doctrine now in force. The current version allows for the use
of nuclear weapons in a response to an attack with weapons of mass
destruction, or a large-scale conventional aggression.

---------------

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12.: NATO May Request More Azerbaijani Troops For Afghanistan

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Thu Dec 24, 2009 6:07 am (PST)

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=113042

Azeri Press Agency
December 24, 2009

Ziyafat Asgarov: "The number of the Azerbaijani servicemen in Afghanistan may be increased"
Elnur Mammadli

Baku: The number of Azerbaijani servicemen in Afghanistan may be increased, First Vice-Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament, Chairman of the Parliament's Security and Defense Committee, Ziyafat Asgarov said, APA reports.

He said that the parliament had not received an appeal for increasing the number of the Azerbaijani servicemen in Afghanistan.

"At the recent meeting of NATO foreign ministers proposal was made to increase the number of the servicemen in Afghanistan. If we receive an appeal, the issue on increasing the number of the Azerbaijani servicemen in Afghanistan may be considered," he said.
==============================
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13.: State Department: Energy War And Death Of Post-Soviet CIS

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Thu Dec 24, 2009 6:21 am (PST)

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=113017

Azeri Press Agency
December 24, 2009

Richard Morningstar: Azerbaijan is still remaining as an important ally in the U.S energy policy towards region
Isabel Levine

-"We believe that such projects, in particular, Nabucco and Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI), are very important in terms of energy diversification so that energy resources will be supplied not only from Azerbaijan, but also from Turkmenistan and possibly from Iraq".

Washington: "Azerbaijan still remains as an important ally in the U.S energy policy towards the region", the Special Envoy of the United States Secretary of State for Eurasian Energy, Richard L. Morningstar told journalists answering APA's Washington DC correspondent's question.

He mentioned that Nabucco is very important in terms of energy diversification and security in the region: "This project opens up many possibilities. We continue to support all projects that involve the delivery of oil and gas to world markets," the US official stressed.

According to Mr. Morningstar, there are at least six former Soviet States within that region whose independence will be enhanced tremendously by the economic development resulting from the resources within that region and we have to work very hard to see that that occurs. He mentioned that, "Azerbaijan is at the top list of our priorities".

"We believe that such projects, in particular, Nabucco and Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI), are very important in terms of energy diversification so that energy resources will be supplied not only from Azerbaijan, but also from Turkmenistan and possibly from Iraq".

The US envoy also mentioned that Washington still hopes Azerbaijan and its neighbors will maximize their production of oil and gas.

"The energy independence point is very significant. The resources from the region should be able to go to the marketplace unfettered [circumventing Russia]. The producers, in our view, should not be relying on competitive countries, such as Iran, to get the resources out. So energy is also a strategic interest," he added.

According to Mr. Morningstar, the regional conflict issue is also very important. By cooperation among the countries in the region, by the economic development of the region, we think that can have a very positive affect in ultimately settling some of the conflicts.

"By settling the conflict, I should add, countries around the region will be able to have, will be able to reap the fruits much more advantageously of the resources".
===========================
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14.: Chechen President: West Seeks To Destroy Russia Through Caucasus

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Thu Dec 24, 2009 6:23 am (PST)

http://rustavi2.com/news/news_text.php?id_news=34998&pg=1&im=main&ct=0&wth=

Rustavi2
December 24, 2009

Ramzan Kadirov says the West wants to destroy Russia

In in interview with the Daily Telegraph online newspaper, Ramzan Kadyrov, a 33-year-old former rebel turned Kremlin loyalist, said Russia should draft a new military strategy to resist the United States and other Western powers, which are stoking disorder in the north Caucasus to destroy Russia.

`Ramzan Kadyrov, a 33-year-old former rebel turned Kremlin loyalist, said that last year`s attack by Georgia, which is a US ally, on the pro-Russian rebel region of South Ossetia was part of a Western plot to seize the whole Caucasus region.

`If they get control of the Caucasus, you could say they`ll get control of virtually all of Russia, because the Caucasus is our backbone,` Kadyrov said. `The Russian government needs to work out a strategy, it needs to attack,` the Chechen president said.

`...Georgia, South Ossetia, Ukraine, all this will go on and on. It`s Russia`s private affliction. Why should we always suffer if we can eradicate this for good? We are a great power, we have everything - an army, technology. We need to attack.` Kadirov said.

The president of Chechnya accused the west of provoking last year's war in Caucasus.
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15.: Afghanistan: NATO's Yearly Death Toll Exceeds 500

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Thu Dec 24, 2009 6:32 am (PST)

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/24/content_12700161.htm

Xinhua News Agency
December 24, 2009

Two NATO soldiers killed in Afghanistan

KABUL: Two soldiers of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have been killed in Afghanistan over the past three days, a press release of the alliance said Thursday.

One of the soldiers is from Britain and another from Canada, according to the press release.

The British soldier was killed Tuesday in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strike in the restive southern region, and Canadian soldier lost his life in a similar attack in the same region on Wednesday, the press release added.

Some 9,000 British troops and more than 2,800 Canadian forces have been stationed in Afghanistan under the command of NATO-led ISAF to help strengthen security in the war-torn country.

Casualties of NATO-led troops in Afghanistan are on the rise, as so far this year, 502 service members have been killed against 295 last year, according to reports.
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16.: Observance Of International Law Or Global "Kosovization"?

Posted by: "Rick Rozoff" rwrozoff@yahoo.com rwrozoff

Thu Dec 24, 2009 6:53 am (PST)

Zivadin Jovanovic
President of the Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals

OBSERVANCE OF LAW, OR GLOBAL KOSOVIZATION
Interview for the "Objektiv" Magazine

Q: Is it possible that the International Court of Justice in The Hague delivers such an opinion that each party will be able to interpret in its own way?

A: This option cannot be ruled out, but need not be the only one. In the early 1990s, many international institutions, including the UN system, began 'resolving' the problems by means of the method of "constructive ambiguities".

Once two sides face insurmountable obstacles, the decision makers formally endorse positions and expectations of both sides. Therefore, at a critical moment, the conflict of the antagonistic positions is overcome, and the actual decision is only made later on, at the stage of interpretation of the endorsed document. The USA inaugurated this approach upon the end of the Cold War because, as the only remaining superpower, it was certain that its interpretation would be final and binding.

The unipolar world is fading away, but multi-polarity is a process. It remains to be seen to what extent the International Court of Justice will prove to be truly independent and resistant to influences characteristic of the past two decades, when it gives its opinion pursuant to Serbia's initiative.

Q: Can we expect that the judges will vote in line with the political positions of their respective countries of origin?

A: This influence exists, but need not be present in each particular case, nor is it singular. In principle, such influence may be in favor of, or contrary to, expectations of a party to the proceedings.

The governments of the leading NATO countries have a lot at stake to get a final opinion of the Court that will justify the unilateral secession of Kosovo, since this was a project of theirs.

This would also support the defense of adopted positions (such as deployment of military forces in the Balkans, the control of oil and gas flows, encircling Russia) and validate the aggression against Serbia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in 1999.

However, not all governments of NATO member states favor the unilateral secession, fearing the ghost of "Kosovization" of Europe and other continents as well. Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazi, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the vast majority of the countries of Africa, Asia, and South America support Serbia's positions and observance of international law. They are against any secession not only in principle but also due to the dictate of protection of own sovereignty and territorial integrity. The influence of the afore-mentioned countries in the international relations, including in the United Nations, is not insignificant, and it rapidly grows.

Q : Can we expect, after the International Court of Justice delivers its opinion, a reversible process related to the recognition of Kosovo's independence, i.e., withdrawal of recognitions by the countries which have already recognized Kosovo?

A: For starters, it will suffice that the Court's opinion eases pressures and blackmail, contributes to the freezing of further recognitions of the illegal situation, thus making possible the consolidation and reinforcing of the positions of Serbia.

Q: What can be the legal consequences of the opinion in The Hague?

A: It is unrealistic to expect any direct legal consequences, because the Court is not tasked to make a legally binding decision; it renders its advisory opinion only.

This opinion will nevertheless have its weight and importance, first and foremost on the future relations and position of the UN bodies, and thereafter on the positions of the UN member states, in relation to Kosovo and Metohija, and also with similar issues elsewhere in the world.

If the Court's opinion observes the principles of international law enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the OSCE Final Act, namely, if it acknowledges the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia as a founder and a member of these two international organizations, Pristina will have no chances of membership thereto. This will only leave Pristina with an option of conceding to the real negotiations on the status of the province.

Q: Do you find it acceptable that the President of the International Court of Justice beforehand states his opinion that the findings of that Court in relation with the Kosovo case will not be "single-directional"?

A: The President of the Court is not alone; the Court has fifteen judges. Even if he were the only one to judge, he would be obliged to follow the procedure set by the Court Statute, instead of making public comments about a pending case.

His public address is but another in a series of symptomatic precedents in usurping the prerogatives of an important institution within the UN system. By prejudging the outcome of a pending case, even if only partially, the President of the Court violated the Statute and inflicted damage to the Court's standing.

It remains to be analyzed what made the President of the International Court of Justice make such a gesture, especially with no apparent cause. Recently, there was some other 'spinning' of the public.

Among others, a thesis was launched that a unilateral secession, although in principle not permitted, nevertheless may be justified and recognized where a minority has been exposed to mass-scale violence by the central government apparatus.

NATO used a strikingly similar 'justification' ten years ago to commit aggression against Serbia, whose tragic consequences are still present.

Now, on the eve of the beginning of the hearing before the International Court of Justice, almost the same 'argumentation' is employed. This can be construed in no other way than as the continuity of the power centers' policy towards Serbia.

Now is the right time to recall the numerous judgments of German courts of law, which unambiguously confirm that, back in the 1990s, there was no organized or mass violence exerted by Serbia (the FRY) against the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija. One should also recall the letter which Mr. Dietmar Hartwig, who was Head of EU Mission in Kosovo and Metohija (the ECMM) until 20 March 1999, addressed to German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 26 October 2007 that, inter alia, reads:

"Not a single report submitted in the period from late November 1998 up to the evacuation on the eve of the war mentioned that Serbs had committed any major or systematic crimes against Albanians, nor was there a single case referring to genocide or genocide-like incidents or crimes.

"Quite the opposite, in my reports I have repeatedly informed that, considering the increasingly more frequent KLA attacks against the Serbian executive, their law enforcement bodies demonstrated remarkable restraint and discipline.

"The clear and often cited goal of the Serbian administration was to observe the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement to the letter so as not to provide any excuse to the international community to intervene.

"There were huge 'discrepancies in perception' between what the missions in Kosovo have been reporting to their respective governments and capitals, and what the latter thereafter released to the media and the public.

"This discrepancy can only be viewed as INPUT TO LONG-TERM PREPARATION FOR WAR AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA. Until the time I left Kosovo, what the media never happened and with no less intensity what the politicians have been relentlessly claiming. Accordingly, UNTIL 20 MARCH 1999 THERE WAS NO REASON FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION, which renders illegitimate measures undertaken thereafter by the international community. The collective behavior of EU Member States prior to, and after the war broke out, gives rise to serious concerns, because THE TRUTH WAS KILLED, AND THE EU LOST RELIABILITY." (All emphasis by Z. J.)

Q: If the decision of the International Court of Justice is by its nature only advisory and non-binding, how could Serbia benefit from it?

A: It will depend on the contents of the opinion. If the Court remains committed to the law and the UN Charter as its founding act, which supports the expectations and vital interests of Serbia and of more than two-thirds of humankind, and it will hugely benefit peace, stability, and prosperity.

It is not an overstatement to say that the Court's position on the issue of the illegal independence of Kosovo is the turning point for the future of the global legal order and global relations. Will Kosovo become a precedent? The answer is known only to those who are loudest in asserting the opposite. The Court's opinion will determine what we will have, peace and prosperity, or instability and conflicts.

(Published in teh weekley "Objektiv", December 2nd, 2009)
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