WHAT AFGHANS WANT-by Andrew Garfield

 

WHAT AFGHANS WANT
by Andrew Garfield

October 30, 2009

Andrew Garfield is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute and Washington Director of the Royal
United Services Institute for Defense an Security Studies
(London).  He is also the founder of Glevum Associates,
which conducts extensive face-to-face social science
research in Afghanistan and Iraq on behalf of the Department
of Defense and other clients. This essay draws on research
performed in connection with a joint FPRI-RUSI study on
Reforming the Afghan National Police, as well as other
attitudinal research undertaken in Afghanistan by Glevum
Associates over the last six months. The views expressed are
the author's and do not represent the policy or judgments of
any organization of the United States Government. The
monograph and archived webcast of a September 17 briefing on
the subject are posted at:
http://www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/afghanpolice/

                    WHAT AFGHANS WANT

                    by Andrew Garfield

Bleak Prospects

Since President Barack Obama's election in November 2008,
countless official reviews, academic studies and popular
articles have been published about the war in Afghanistan,
and how it should be fought.  Journalists, generals and
academics have all visited Afghanistan, met with Afghan
officials, interviewed a few ordinary Afghans, and written
lengthy reports on the problems there.  They have suggested
various strategies that the US-led Coalition should adopt to
support the Afghan Government and defeat a resurgent
Taliban.  Yet, despite this tidal wave of well-intentioned
advice, changes of command, and a recent limited surge of
troops, Taliban influence has continued to spread, popular
support for both the Coalition and the Afghan Government has
diminished, and Coalition causalities have mounted.

The conflict's ever-extending duration, seeming
intractability, and apparent lack of success have led many
to question the efficacy of continuing the war. This is the
case especially in Europe.  Yet even in the United Kingdom,
which has been a staunch U.S. ally, support for the war is
beginning to wane at a time when British casualties in
Afghanistan have recently surpassed those suffered in the
Iraq war.  Certainly an embolden Taliban believes that, at
the very least, the European Coalition partners will soon
grow weary of what increasingly seems like an unending and
perhaps unwinnable war.  Even in the United States, some
critics have suggested that Afghanistan could become Obama's
Vietnam.  What then is the right approach to winning this
war?  Indeed, can this war be won at all?  To answer these
question, I recommend looking at an obvious, source - the
Afghan people themselves.

Hearing but not Listening - Seeing but not Recognizing

The United States military, as well as its Coalition
partners' militaries, know that, at its core,
counterinsurgency is a struggle for the "hearts and minds"
of the Afghan people. In this multifaceted struggle, the
Afghan Government and its Coalition partners also understand
that an integrated synergistic campaign is needed that
includes an equal focus on development, governance and
security.  Coalition militaries increasingly understand that
killing and arresting Anti Government Elements (AGEs) is a
largely futile exercise, if popular support is lost in the
process, and AGE losses are easily replaced by an
increasingly supportive or at least compliant population.

In addition, both the Afghan Government and the Coalition
know that our adversaries realize they are battling for the
very soul of the Afghan people and that they will use every
opportunity to enhance their image, promote their ideology
and divide Afghans from each other, their Government and the
Coalition.  We also understand that the AGEs effectively use
resentment and anger, ethnic, tribal and familial ties,
common narratives, violent and intimidating actions and
propaganda to promote their cause.

Why then, if we know what it takes to win this fight and we
are acutely aware that our adversary knows, are we
struggling to prevail in Afghanistan?  Perhaps even losing,
at least at the strategic level, where the insurgent wins
simply by not losing.

The answer, I believe, is that we have singularly failed to
listen to what both eminent and ordinary Afghans have to
say.  They continue to tell us what issues matter most to
them, what strategy and actions they want us to adopt, and
which words and deeds they want us to eschew.
Unfortunately, all too often, they speak but we do not
listen.  We see but do not recognize.  We act but we do not
consult.

Even after seven years, we still make sweeping
generalizations about Afghanistan and its people based on
superficial learning. Meanwhile our planners and officials
remain isolated on our bases and embassies, rarely if ever
engaging directly with the local population. Instead they
rely on cultural advisors who themselves hardly ever go
outside "the wire".  And we change policy based on reviews
conducted in a matter of a few weeks, often by experts
parachuted into Afghanistan for the duration of the study.
These experts subsequently produce reports that at best can
only provide a snap shot of Afghan society and the numerous
points of friction in it.

Cultural Understanding = Front Line Success

We have had the greatest success in Afghanistan ironically,
on the front line.  U.S. and Coalition brigades and
battalions who live in the heart of Afghan communities have,
for the most part, developed an intimate understanding of
the communities they support.  This has been achieved
through their direct engagement with the local population.
U.S. forces, in particular, have engaged in formal cultural
education with the support of social scientists in the often
maligned but essential Human Terrain Teams.  Armed with this
crucial cultural knowledge, the grunts have cemented many
successful relationships with local leaders and ordinary
Afghans alike.  With their Afghan Army colleagues, they have
used this knowledge to pacify successfully those few areas
where they have a sustained presence.  However, this
localized tactical success is not matched sufficiently by
carefully targeted regional and national programs designed
to address the numerous problems facing Afghans today.
These programs must consolidate the hard won tactical
success of the brigades and battalions, supporting
Provisional Reconstruction Teams, and a few stalwart NGOs.

Human Terrain Research

If the key to success in Afghanistan is listening to and
understanding the local population, how is this achieved,
particularly at the operational and strategic levels?  It is
certainly not achieved through relying on a few cultural
advisors with limited connections to the communities with
whom we are engaging.  It is also not achieved through the
random use of opinion surveys developed by planners and
staff officers permanently stationed in larger bases and
embassies.

 "All generalizations are dangerous, even this one"
  -- Alexandre Dumas

Without understanding the human terrain, one can only make
sweeping generalizations about Afghanistan based on
superficial learning, which can have deadly consequences at
the tactical level and undermine national objectives at the
strategic level. Critical socio-cultural factors that need
to be fully understood include ethnicity, tribal structures,
social status, education, gender, affluence, age, religion,
politics, sources of power and authority, belief systems,
personal preferences, affiliations, inter and intra-
community relationships, macro and micro economics, industry
and business, and of course security and the insurgency.

The key to determining all Afghans' identities and to
finding out what ordinary Afghans think, is to undertake a
coordinated program designed to elicit the views of all
segments of Afghan society, both the elites and ordinary
citizens.  Such a program must utilize a carefully
coordinated combination of polls, focus groups, depth
interviews, field research, observations, and the insights
of Afghan Subject Matter Experts combined with unit insights
secured through direct engagement in order to build up a
sophisticated picture of what we need to do to prevail in
Afghanistan.

To provide these critical cultural insights, the US Army's
Human Terrain System has developed  the Social Science
Research and Analysis (SSRA) program, in conjunction with a
contractor. The SSRA program utilizes a combination of
social science-based qualitative and quantitative research
and analysis techniques, to include the extensive use of
polls, focus groups and interviews.  This research is
combined with insights provided by a talented pool of Afghan
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to provide a comprehensive
overview of Afghan society and Afghan needs and wants.  This
research is then fused with the insights provided by the
deployed Human Terrain Teams and Regional Reach Back Centers
to provide a comprehensive picture of the Afghan population.

Although funding for this program is limited it has provided
the type of critical insights that should inform all Afghan
Government and Coalition plans and actions.  The irony of
this research is that it identifies several simple, mundane,
and understandable problems that are undermining everything
that the Afghan Government and Coalition is trying to
achieve in Afghanistan.  However, these problems require
costly solutions to overcome them.

What Afghans Want

The key issues for both Afghan elites and ordinary citizens,
which have been determined through a carefully coordinated
HTS funded research program, are outlined here.  In my
opinion, the Afghan Government and Coalition must address
these issues if we are to prevail against the Taliban-a
victory that this research also indicates most Afghans
actually want.

Corruption - Root of all Evil

 "Corruption came to Afghanistan and dramatically developed
 after the end of 2001.  It has been practiced and applied
 just like a well-recognized law in the country."
  -- A senior Afghan Police Officer

Corruption touches nearly every aspect of an Afghan's life,
requiring payment to obtain essential services; acquire
passports, permits, licenses, and other official documents;
secure jobs; and obtain medical attention, to list just a
few examples. Many Afghans seem resigned to this situation,
even while describing such corruption as un-Islamic and a
plague on Afghan society.

Most respondents lack confidence in the Afghan legal
establishment's ability or willingness to end the
corruption, given that most police officers, lawyers, and
judges reportedly profit from corrupt practices.  They are
also pessimistic that the Presidential elections, once this
sorry saga is finally concluded, will make any tangible
difference, because Government corruption has become
institutionalized.  As one Afghan SME put it:

 "No official can get a high position in the government
 without giving a bribe to the recruiters.  The appointees
 have already given bribes and now they have to take bribes
 from others."

Almost all Afghans interviewed for this research effort view
every branch of the central government as corrupt.  Indeed,
many older Afghans consider the current government as the
most corrupt in their memory. Bribery of government
officials, extortion and embezzlement by government
officials, and nepotism in hiring for all government posts
are reported to be the three most pervasive types of
corruption.

Taking money to support poor salaries is not viewed
negatively by many Afghans, who reason that the low salaries
of junior ranking government officials are a root cause of
corruption.  However,  it is also noted that the most
corrupt are often the most senior and well-paid officials.

Most respondents consider Kabul to be the most corrupt city
in the country and many suggest that it is the need to bribe
government officials that forces many Afghans to go to Kabul
in order to obtain services and resolve disputes.

 "Unless the present corruption is curbed, local people will
 not have trust and they will not coordinate with the central
 government." -- An Afghan SME

According to many of the Afghans interviewed, the
government's legitimacy is being actively undermined by the
majority of public officials who exploit positions of
authority for their own gain.  When asked to estimate the
percentage of corrupt government officials, most respondents
estimated that between 80 and 90 percent of those currently
serving in government posts are using their positions to
enrich their own personal wealth.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is often the face of
corruption most frequently encountered by the Afghan people.
Corrupt police officers' actions further erode public
confidence in the government overall.  However, most Afghans
do not consider ANP corruption as the most corrosive form of
corruption in the country.  Rather, it is embezzlement by
high-ranking government officials-governors,
parliamentarians and ministers-that worries Afghans the
most.  These men are considered guardians of the country and
their illegal activity is seen as having a significantly
larger effect on Afghanistan's development than that of many
mid and low-level officials who are simply trying to make
ends meet and supplement their meager income.

 "One of the reasons that local people refer to Taliban
 verdicts is that local people do not trust government courts
 and government officials.  Local people know that the
 government is corrupt." Wardak Tribal Leader and SME

Many Pashtun Afghans view Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) as
far less corrupt than government officials and offices.
This resonates with many Pashtu respondents who often note
that there was far less corruption when the Taliban was
running the country.  It is, therefore, not surprising that
those Afghans who refer to previous governments, are quick
to note that the current government in Kabul is the most
corrupt in memory.

This culture of endemic- and epidemic-corruption is rapidly
destabilizing the country and seriously undermining
Coalition efforts to introduce both effective governance and
sustainable development.  Such high levels of perceived
corruption seriously undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan
National Government, and to a lesser extent that of
provincial, and district government.  Such corruption is
also a propaganda coup to the Taliban.  Unless the Coalition
recognizes that this level of corruption must be
substantially reduced, public support for the Afghan
Government can only diminish and support for the Taliban, at
least in Pashtu communities, is likely to increase.  This
Afghan problem cannot be avoided.  No matter how difficult a
task, the Afghan Government must be compelled to deal with
it or there is little hope that public resentment and
growing support for the Taliban can be reversed.

Rule of Law - Resolving Disputes

Afghanistan is a society with many points of friction.  The
feudal, tribal  and ultra-conservative nature of its society
and the impact of over 30 years of occupation and civil war
have created numerous points of conflict/dispute in a
country that has always lacked a reliable, centrally
administered and timely source of organized justice.  This
is compounded by the lack of a national land registry and
disputes resulting from the recent civil war.  The result is
frequent local disputes, often over land and other property,
that need to be resolved quickly before they escalate. All
too often they are resolved violently, perpetuating
community conflicts that can be traced back centuries and
can last for decades.  However, most Afghans agree that Rule
of Law is failing in many areas of Afghanistan and that it
is almost impossible to obtain timely and impartial dispute
resolution and fairly administered justice.

The majority of Pashtun Afghans interviewed complain that
the Kabul administered legal system is systemically corrupt,
and that most judges, the police and lawyers are corrupt, as
well.  Most surveyed, complain that too often favorable
verdicts can be secured and punishments reduced or avoided
through the paying of bribes or through connections.
Afghans also complain that at the village level, it is
almost impossible to gain timely access to the judicial
process.  Buying into a popular myth perpetuated by the
Taliban, many Pashtun also complain that the current legal
system is too secular and insufficiently pious/Islamic.
This is despite that fact that recent depth interviews
conducted for the HTS program with senior Afghan judges
indicates that as many as 89 percent of Afghanistan judges
have been educated at an Islamic legal school.

The Taliban have been quick to fill this perceived Rule of
Law vacuum.  Their travelling "kangaroo courts" administer a
form of justice quickly, and from many Pashtuns perspective
fairly, and then ensure that usually draconian punishment is
handed out quickly.  To ordinary Afghans who desire timely,
impartial and pious justice, the Taliban courts have a
certain appeal and they are willing to look past the severe
punishments often handed out.  The Taliban are able to pass
these courts off as Islamic, even through few if any of the
"judges" have any formal Islamic legal training, which most
Afghan judges do.  The provision of justice by the Taliban
is one of the most tangible examples of their shadow
government strategy in Afghanistan, which severely
undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan Government and the
Coalition's effectiveness.

In order to undermine popular support for the Taliban and
introduce stability in Afghanistan, it is therefore
essential that the International Community support and if
necessary compel the Afghan Government to significantly
reduce corruption in the legal system and extend the rule of
law down to the village level.  This could be achieved in a
number of ways including better oversight and a robust
internal affairs organization and through the deployment of
well-protected circuit judges, not unlike those who used to
administer justice in America's "Wild West."  We must also
speed up the registration of land and seek to promote the
Islamic underpinnings of the existing legal system, in order
to bolster community support for it, and to discredit the
Taliban's rule of law arguments.  Such a program Afghans
believe, would significantly improve the image of the Afghan
Government; resolve most disputes quickly; and delegitimize
a key facet of the Taliban's shadow government strategy

Quality of Life

Afghanistan is without doubt one of the poorest countries on
earth.  One only has to spend a few days in Kabul- let alone
in the remote districts of the border provinces-to encounter
abject poverty and despair.  For most Afghans surveyed, life
is a daily struggle to survive.  In survey after survey,
Afghans report that securing jobs and/or an income is
critically important to them and almost impossible to
achieve. Yet, efforts to develop Afghanistan's economy are
woefully inadequate.  Most Afghan respondents understand the
direct link between their inability to find work and/or an
income, and the increase in criminality and support for
AGEs.  Indeed, in one recent survey a majority of Afghans
identified the lack of jobs as the second most likely cause
of instability and the unemployed as the second most likely
to cause a security problem.  Ironically, in this survey the
Government and the police were viewed as having created the
most insecurity in the country.

The Taliban has sought to establish shadow government in
many districts and to provide welfare programs and incomes
for unemployed young men.  Bored, disaffected, and angry
unemployed young men offer ripe pickings for the AGE
recruiters, who offer hope, honor and income to those
without any.  When this is combined with a coercive element
and peer and community pressure, it is easy to see why the
ranks of the Taliban are growing.  Yet, many Afghans
indicate that they would resist the AGE recruiters if they
had alternatives-if they had jobs; if they could secure
funds to expand farms and start businesses; if the
Government would invest in roads and irrigation to help them
prosper.

The inability of the Afghan government to provide for all
its people (despite some successes with key development
programs such as the National Solidarity Program) also
encourages them to seek alternative often-criminal sources
of income. The cultivation of drugs is the most obvious
example.  It also encourages others to exploit the country's
few natural resources leading to a potential environmental
disaster in some areas.  For example, in some districts
respondents report that the only "export" is wood for fires.
As there is no program of sustainable development, this
leads to deforestation and erosion, new problems that
Afghanistan can ill afford.

Whether the international community likes it or not, unless
there is a coordinated, long term and well-funded program to
develop the Afghan economy, providing jobs for a majority
and at least a livable income for most, support for the
Taliban will most likely grow.  The insurgent enemy only has
to promise that it will make things better for the majority
and make only a marginal improvement in the quality of life
for its supporters in order to prosper.  The government has
to make a real difference and improve the quality of life
for a majority of it is citizens or it will fail.

Clearly, there are many obstacles to developing a viable
economy in Afghanistan, not the least of which is rampant
corruption, particularly in government.  To secure
improvement in all areas is impossible.  However, until we
start hearing what the Afghans are saying-that they need
jobs and a minimum level of income-and we try to do
something serious about it, we will remain at a huge
disadvantage to the Taliban and other AGEs.

Dealing With Illiteracy - Education, Education, Education

Most Afghans interviewed agree-illiteracy undermines almost
every facet of public and private life in Afghanistan.  They
say it denies opportunities to those who cannot read or
write.  It diminishes the effectiveness of key institutions,
such as the police and army, which are forced to recruit
illiterate candidates.  It seriously undermines government
efficiency.  It significantly reduces the intellectual
capacity of the country, which is utterly inadequate already
to support the development of a viable economy and modern
society.  It perpetuates the endemic corruption that plagues
Afghan society and it fosters ignorance, intolerance, and
superstition.  Even some traditional and ultra-conservative
tribal elders lament the high levels of female illiteracy,
on one level,  because it limits the availability of female
doctors, midwives and nurses to reduce the appalling levels
of female and child mortality.  Perhaps most importantly of
all, Afghans say, it reduces the availability of teachers
who can break the country's cycle of illiteracy.

What research shows most Afghans agree is desperately
needed, to use an oft-quoted political mantra, is Education,
Education, Education.  When Afghans talk about education
however, they do not mean schools.  The Coalition loves to
build schools.  It is easy to do and there is a tangible
result allowing them to "tick the box.". However, it is not
schools that provide education Afghans say, it is teachers
and a functioning education system.  Most Afghans
interviewed consistently lament the inadequacy of the
education system, not the lack of school buildings.

Afghans rail at the paucity of well-qualified teachers.
They complain about the low wages of teachers or the fact
that they are not paid at all.  They report that many
teachers are not qualified to fill their posts and have
obtained their positions through corruption and nepotism.
As a result, they demand fairly administered entrance exams
and well funded teacher-training programs.  They are
indignant at the corruption in the education system, which
Afghan SMEs estimates has led to as many as 14,000 phantom
teachers on the books, drawing wages but not teaching.  They
discuss the lack of school supplies and books and
occasionally they talk about the poor quality of maintenance
and upkeep of school buildings- including the ones built by
the Coalition.  Interestingly, many Afghans, including
conservative Pashtun, complain bitterly about the Taliban
destruction of schools and even girls 'schools.  This is one
tactic that most Afghans reject unreservedly.

What does this mean for the Afghan government and the
international community? The answer is simple.  We need to
support with funds, expertise, oversight, and protection, a
systematic and well-funded education program that quickly
"grows" thousands of qualified teachers, who are given
proper assignments and decent pay and who are supported by a
reasonably honest and efficient education system that
provides books, supplies and maintains buildings.  And yes,
we do need to build more schools.  Unless we support such a
long-term education program, Afghanistan will never escape
this cycle of illiteracy, which as the Afghans themselves
say, undermines everything else they do.  We will also
embolden the AGEs and allow them to continue to exploit
resentment, and the ignorance and intolerance that can be
ameliorated by education.

Democracy - More Not Less

The Afghans want representative governance.  They want to
choose their own government and they want that government to
represent their interests.  Afghans have for centuries
enjoyed a form of representative government provided by the
Jirga system, which is a body of the "great and good"
assembled to address a specific issue.  A Jirga is normally
assembled from community leaders who are perceived by most
in the community as their legitimate representatives.
Afghans also trust community elders and religious clerics to
resolve disputes and administer justice.  They therefore
know what representative governance looks like. Yet many say
they do not see it below the national level.

This is because Afghanistan lacks a truly representative
form of government below the national level.  Provincial
Governors are appointed by the President and so on down to
the district level.  This is a source of great resentment
for many Afghans, especially the Pashtu, who also see
significant ethnic bias and nepotism in the president's and
governor's appointments.  This, in turn, undermines support
for the government at all levels.  The recent empowerment by
the national government of local leaders and Jirga, as a
perceived legitimate alternative to central government
administration, further undermines the importance of and
trust in government institutions.

Some Afghans-in particular the Pashtun elites-are concerned
that the type of national democracy introduced after 2001
also makes representative governance more difficult and
prevents the emergence of a viable opposition.  This is
because the current system is based on the election of
individuals rather than political parties.  Without a party
system, some fear that it may be nearly impossible to
organize a viable opposition that can defeat a powerful
president.

What these Afghans believe, is that Afghanistan urgently
needs more democracy not less.  The Afghan government must,
therefore, be encouraged, perhaps compelled, to introduce
regional and district elections at the earliest opportunity.
Hopefully, this will encourage more Afghans to feel part of
the electoral process and develop greater trust in their
government. It would certainly deny the Taliban one of their
chief recruiting tools.  The success of the recent regional
elections in Iraq bodes well for Afghanistan.  It is also
necessary for the international community to foster the
development and emergence of political parties in
Afghanistan, that become in time, a viable opposition, which
is one of the cornerstones of a successful democracy.

Infrastructure - Roads, Water and Electricity

Older Afghan SMEs say that Afghanistan had better
infrastructure during the Soviet occupation than it does
today after seven years of Western intervention.  This is
hard to argue against when you drive around Kabul and see
the suburbs of communist era housing, drive on roads built
by the Soviet army or fly over a city of four million
inhabitants that is remarkable for the lack of illumination.
Afghanistan's infrastructure is woefully inadequate and it
undermines good governance, sustainable development and
effective security.  It also dislocates the expectations of
many Afghans who expected better after seven years of
Western support.

Afghanistan urgently needs an effective road-building
program. This is essential for a viable economy and in order
to bring governance and services to remote areas.  It is
also essential to allow the Afghan Army and police to
disperse their limited resources to protect as much of the
population as possible.  Even the Romans understood the
importance of roads for security.  Such roads need to be
built by Afghans and they need to be properly maintained.
Afghans also say that they desperately need improved
sanitation in the cities and major irrigation projects in
the rural areas to help develop the agricultural industry on
which so many Afghans rely for their income and food.  And
all Afghans need access to electricity at least for part of
each day.

These are basic services that underpin any emerging society.
It is, therefore, essential that the international community
support the Afghan Government with a systematic well-funded
and long-term program to build and restore services and
infrastructure that primarily was built well before the
Soviet withdrawal in 1989.  Such a program will
significantly enhance security and reduce the effectiveness
of the Taliban.

Security - Collateral Damage - Avoiding the "come-on"

The one issue pertaining to the Coalition that consistently
creates the most consternation among Afghans is  collateral
damage.  Numerous surveys and interviews strongly indicate
that most Afghans perceive that the Coalition in general and
the U.S. military in particular as having little regard for
the safety of Afghans.  This attitude has a serious effect
on the legitimacy of the Afghan government, which is seen as
powerless to stop the deaths of Afghan civilians.  Certain
tactics used by the Coalition, including nighttime searches
of people and property are also viewed with considerable
disdain by a majority and equated with the tactics used by
the Taliban.

The recent collateral damage incident in Farah Province is
illustrative of how these incidents are perceived.  Beyond
the general outrage of most Afghans, the views of several
SMEs was very informative.  They argued that the most
insulting and damaging aspect of this sorry episode was the
U.S. government's focus on the varying reported totals of
civilian deaths rather than on the tragic loss of life.  It
was almost as if the U.S. military felt that they were the
aggrieved party because of the exaggerated losses reported
by some sources including the media.  Even if the U.S.
figures of 20 to 40 civilians killed were accurate, this was
still considered to be far too many avoidable deaths. It was
this fact, they believe, that the United States should have
focused on.  Other SMEs expressed frustration that the
Coalition was still falling into the Taliban's trap and
allowing themselves to become embroiled in firefights in
villages using airpower that almost always result in
civilian deaths.  As one SME put it "why not just walk away,
watch from afar and kill them when they leave or on another
day"

The negative impact of civilian deaths on Coalition support
cannot be underestimated. Every time it occurs, the
Coalition makes more enemies and hands another propaganda
coup to the Taliban.  The focus of the Coalition must,
therefore, be on protecting the population not on killing
and arresting AGEs.  The current campaign in Helmand is
necessary to drive an entrenched Taliban out of this
province but combat operations involving mass sweep and
search operations will not lead to the defeat of the
Taliban.  Permanent presence and intelligence-led operations
using information willingly provided by an increasingly
supportive population, and requiring minimal deadly force,
is the only way to defeat the Taliban's physical threat.
Until such time as the Coalition is seen by Afghans to value
their lives as much as their own, more Afghans will question
the value of continued support.

Security - Afghan National Police

Many Afghans complain that nepotism, corruption and ethnic
divisions are rife in the Afghan police force, problems that
are not easily remedied even with international community
intervention and support.  They also complain that the
police are ineffective, slow to respond to incidents and
unwilling to thoroughly investigate crimes.   However, many
of these problems are endemic in Afghan civil
society-particularly within the Afghan government at all
levels-and cannot be addressed simply through reforming the
police.  The reform of the entire system of governance in
Afghanistan is needed to correct these systemic problems.

When asked, senior Afghan police officers also complain
about problems that are entirely correctable with
international community support.  For example, they complain
about high levels of illiteracy, which negatively impacts
the effectiveness of the police, as well as the lack of
reliable and effective equipment, and the skills and
supplies needed to maintain this equipment.  They also
complain about the training offered by the international
community which they say involves too many countries
applying different policing models. These models they
consider either confusing or inappropriate to the Afghan
situation.  They also complain about a lack of funds for pay
and the use of the Afghan police in roles for which they are
ill suited, such as confronting Anti Government Forces.
These challenges and shortcomings could be addressed by a
better resourced and coordinated international police
assistance program.  Dealing with societal challenges such
as endemic corruption and illiteracy requires a much more
fundamental and generational challenge.

They Want Us to Win

Some in the West ask, are the Afghans worth it?  Do they
really care?  Do they actually want peace?  The resounding
answer to all of these questions is "yes."  The vast
majority of Afghans including the Pashtun and many Talibs
want peace and stability in Afghanistan.  And they will
reject the Taliban if they have a viable alternative that
offers protection and quality of life.  While they see
little or no hope, while they perceive the Afghan Government
to be corrupt and the Coalition to have a disregard for
their safety, and while the Taliban remains menacingly in
their midst, they will continue to sit on the fence or
cooperate with the men with guns.  It is up to us, and the
Afghan Government, to offer them hope and the prospect of a
better future. They will then come off the fence and support
our collective efforts.

Summary - Back to the Future

The United States was instrumental in rebuilding a strong,
prosperous, democratic and- most importantly- peaceful post-
war Europe and it did so without losing the support of most
Europeans.  U.S. leaders at that time clearly understood
what was needed to avoid the reemergence of dictators and
extremism.  America, therefore, made the commitment to
assist the European nations and especially the defeated Axis
powers. They committed to develop strong democratic
institutions, robust successful economies, rebuild their
shattered industry and infrastructure, and maintain the
capacity to defend themselves against internal and external
threats without posing a threat to others.  This meant
America needed to make an almost 50-year commitment to
Europe and to expend vast amounts of national treasure to
achieve a goal that brought the most benefit to the citizens
of countries that were not always entirely grateful.  As a
result, Europe today is more integrated, prosperous and
peaceful than at any time in its history, testimony to an
American approach built on the pillars of democracy,
development and security.

If we are to succeed in Afghanistan, both the United States
and its European allies must heed the advice of the Afghans
themselves and make a similar long-term commitment to
rebuilding this failing State.  We must deal with endemic
corruption, which is a plague on Afghan society.  We must
encourage the Afghan Government to extend democracy down to
the lowest levels and support the development of a viable
party system.  Impartial, timely and pious justice must be
available to all Afghan to resolve disputes and reduce the
many points of friction that exist in Afghan society.

We must improve the quality of life of most Afghans by
helping to develop and grow an economy that can provide
legitimate sources of income for the majority of Afghans and
fund essential improvements in basic infrastructure
including more roads, irrigation, better sanitation, and
access to electricity.  It is essential that we invest in
the future of Afghanistan by supporting a functioning and
effective education system and we need to ensure that
Afghans have access to at least rudimentary medical care.
Furthermore, we must improve the capabilities of the Afghan
National Army and the Afghan National Police and continue to
assist them to protect the Afghan population from the
Talban.  We must do so without being suckered into
collateral damage situations, thereby alienating the
population we are supposed to protect.

In a country like Afghanistan, this is a tall order indeed.
If we are willing to make the commitment in terms of
treasure, blood, sweat, tears and patience we can prevail.
Most Afghans want us to prevail.  If we are not prepared to
make a similar commitment to Afghanistan that America made
to Europe in 1945, we might as well throw in the towel now,
and deal with the consequences. Anything less than a total
and long-term commitment is likely to lead to failure
anyway.

 

--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!


--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!