Friday, September 11, 2009

Fwd: Intelligence and warfare


VIEW: Intelligence and warfare

—Brigadier Shaukat Qadir
 
 
2005

Though firepower is undisputedly the deciding factor in battle, particularly when coupled with accurate intelligence, its application at the right time and place and against the right forces is essential for success. This is where human judgment comes in 
 
Senior US commanders claim that American forces are unmatched in the world because of their superiority in intelligence, firepower and logistics. Undoubtedly, these are the three most essential ingredients for success in the field of battle. However, most of them omit to mention another essential ingredient in the American case — their ability to transport troops and firepower into the battlefield. The American forces are configured to fight overseas and not in defence of their own homeland. Perhaps it isn't mentioned because they include it in logistics.  
 
American technology, which is the most advanced in the world, can provide accurate real time information of any kind. There are however, a couple of catches. For instance, if they wish to follow my activity, they have a residential address for me and can programme their satellites to pick me up and tail me 24 hours a day.  
 
On the other hand, if they are looking for someone like Osama Bin Laden, who could be in one of the thousands of caves in Tora Bora spread over a few hundred square kilometres, they need to either obtain an identifiable address for him or collate and analyse general information to make an educated guess. For the former they need human intelligence while the latter only seems to work in American movies. Real life is not that simple. This is clear from the US failure to trace him to date. However, American intelligence works well when it comes to larger forces in the battlefield. 
 
Though firepower is undisputedly the deciding factor in battle, particularly when coupled with accurate intelligence, its application at the right time and place and against the right forces is essential for success. This is where human judgment comes in and the abilities of the commanders in the field can and do make a difference.  
 
This is particularly relevant to the modern war against terrorism, but only if the troops are conscious that there should be minimal "collateral damage". Their indiscriminate use of superior firepower will only result in swelling the ranks of those they are fighting.  
 
Thus far American troops appear to have demonstrated little concern for enemy lives. This is demonstrated by their inability to capture or kill Osama, despite their military superiority and by the fact that those opposing them are still extracting a toll in both Afghanistan and Iraq
 
Logistics is the relatively ignored aspect of most militaries. In countries like ours, which plan solely for wars with neighbouring countries, the significance of well-planned logistic support tends to get underplayed. However, for those like the US that plan for overseas operations, logistics precedes the planning of an operation.  
 
This is why logistics are less important for Pakistan and India. The significance has only recently been recognised. Even the Kargil Operation planned secretly by Pakistan suffered from seriously inadequate logistic support. Even though the entire operation lasted only about four weeks, logistical inadequacies took a toll before the withdrawal. 
 
I hope it is now clear that success in the field of battle is contingent on three elements: intelligence, firepower and logistics and, second, that success also depends on how these are employed. Ultimately, the tools are only as good as those using them. 
 
However, we also need to understand that if these factors guaranteed victory, no smaller army — less well equipped and logistically inferior — would ever have defeated a larger force with better firepower and logistics. However, history is replete with examples of smaller and relatively ill-equipped forces defeating superior numbers. For example in the battle of Yarmuk, Khalid Bin Walid defeated an army ten times larger, which had better firepower and logistics. In later years Napolean's campaigns defeated a larger force at the battle(s) of Ulm-Austerlitz when he was logistically extended beyond his limits and was forced to cede the advantageous position in the battlefield. Admittedly, in both these examples, the smaller forces enjoyed superiority in intelligence, though not in other aspects. 
 
At the present juncture, the balance in intelligence, firepower and logistics is tilted in favour of the American forces. Hence defeat in a conventional battle is unimaginable for them, even if they commit blunders, as they have done in recent battles. Their vast superiority in firepower alone atones for their mistakes.  
 
However, if this differential were to be reduced in the future, their success might not be as certain. And finally, despite their superiority in these aspects, they have been forced to withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and they might possibly be forced to withdraw from Iraq as well. In sub-conventional warfare, the interpretation of intelligence is far more important than its acquisition. Consequently, while the latter might suffice for conventional warfare, weak or faulty interpretation of intelligence might seriously hamper their success in the face of determined resistance from freedom fighters.


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